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Jesselyn Alicia Brown'
Think back on any number of stories of health insurance atrocities: the Texas man
whose employer was allowed to slash his AIDS coverage as he was dying of the
disease; the retiree whose "lifetime" insurance was suddenly canceled; the woman
with advanced breast cancer unfairly denied coverage for the only treatment that
might save her life. All these cases have one unexpected thing in common: the
monumentally boring, complex, far-reaching law called ERISA.'
Before the failure of federal health care reform in Washington last year,
many states were already exploring ways to address the health care crisis' on
their own. Vermont, Florida, and Minnesota spent 1993 implementing new
laws to widen access to their uninsured. 3 New York implemented community
rating in April 1993 for all health insurance sold in the state.4 The same year,
California, Florida, and Texas introduced comprehensive, small-group market
reform measures, forming numerous community health purchasing alliances
within each respective state.' Despite the demise of national health care
reform, action continues at the state level.
But states have only gone so far in promulgating reforms. Many perceive
a major obstacle in the preemption of state law by the Employee Retirement
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1. Nina Martin, ERISA: The Law That Ate Health Care Reform, CAL. LAWYER, May 1993, at 40,
41.
2. "In 1991, the United States spent over $700 billion... to provide health care services [about
13 % of GNP], while, by 1990, the number of uninsured people under the age of 65 had increased to
over 33 million." UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HRD-92-70, ACCESS TO
HEALTH CARE: STATES RESPOND TO GROWING CRISIS 12 (1992) [hereinafter STATES RESPOND].
3. The states all passed the relevant laws in 1992. See States Take Their Own Reform Steps, MED.
& HEALTH, July 19, 1993, at 3, 4.
4. C. Chris Lau, The States v. Washington, BEST'S REV. - LIFE-HEALTH INS. EDITION, Feb.
1995, at 52, 54.
5. Id.
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 13:339, 1995
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA).6 The primary purpose of ERISA is to
regulate pension plans sponsored by private employers. While the word
"retirement" appears prominently in its title, ERISA goes beyond regulating
pension plans to cover a wide range of other benefit plans-including plans that
provide employee health care, disability, and accident benefits. Most
importantly, ERISA preempts many forms of state regulation affecting health
benefit packages.
While ERISA allows states to regulate health insurance,' it also shields
self-funded plans from most state laws. 8 Insured health plans are therefore
subject to such requirements as consumer protection provisions, state-mandated
benefit laws, premium taxes, "any willing provider" laws, and participation in
community-rated or high-risk pools, while self-funded plans are not.9 The
shield that ERISA preemption provides to self-funded plans causes state health
care planners consternation for two reasons. First, clearly distinguishing
between self-funded and fully insured plans is growing more difficult as the
health market changes. Often self-funded plans simplify their administrative
burden by contracting with an insurance company or other organization to
perform administrative services."0 As a result employees themselves often do
not know whether their employer-based health plan is self-funded or purchased
through an insurer. Furthermore, employers are increasingly adopting
arrangements that are neither fully insured nor fully self-funded. These
arrangements include increased use of "stop-loss" insurance" to moderate the
employers' risk, as well as alternative arrangements with managed care
6. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1982)). President Ford signed ERISA into law on
September 2, 1974. For a detailed guide, see STEVEN S. GOLDBERG, PENSION PLANS UNDER ERISA
(1976).
7. For a more detailed discussion of how ERISA preserves states' authority to regulate insurance
through the insurance savings clause, see infra text accompanying notes 77-83.
8. In a self-funded health plan an employer directly holds much of the financial risk associated with
its employees' health care costs. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-95-
167, EMPLOYER-BASED HEALTH PLANS: ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES POSED BY ERISA (1995)
[hereinafter ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES]. Although both the terms "self-insured" and "self-
funded" are commonly used to describe employer health plans that are less than fully insured, neither
is completely accurate. Insurance is a contractual agreement in which financial risk from one party (the
"insured") is transferred to another party (the "insurer"). Following the lead of the General Accounting
Office, this Note refers to firms that bear a large portion of the risk for employee health claims as self-
funded rather than self-insured because no insurance arrangement covers this risk. Even the term "self-
funded" may not be entirely accurate because, in most cases, employers do not set aside separate funds
to finance their health plans but pay for incurred health costs through general assets. A more accurate
but too awkward term may be "less than fully insured" because many employers with self-funded plans
purchase stop-loss insurance to mitigate their potential losses or purchase prepaid health care contracts
for some employees. See id. at 3 n.2.
9. Because self-funded plans are not deemed to be insurance, ERISA's preemption clause protects
them from certain state regulatory programs and reforms. For a more detailed discussion of ERISA's
deemer clause which draws this distinction, see infra text accompanying notes 84-90.
10. These are typically called "administrative services only" contracts and are performed by "third-
party administrators."
11. For a more detailed discussion of stop-loss insurance and how it relates to ERISA preemption,
see infra text accompanying note 233.
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organizations that share risk among the plan, providers, and the employer.12
The second cause of frustration for would-be state health care reformers is
that self-funded plans constitute an increasingly large portion of the health care
purchasing market. According to the General Accounting Office (GAO), few
employers self-funded when ERISA became effective in 1974, meaning that
most health benefit plans were subject to state regulation. Now, with ERISA
health plans 3 covering nearly half of all workers in the United States, nearly
forty percent of ERISA plans are self-funded.14 The GAO hypothesizes that
the growth in self-funding among firms of all sizes reflects employers'
recognition that self-funding employee health benefits offers three main
advantages:
Employers believe that self-funding allows them to directly gain from their cost-
containment efforts by having plan design flexibility, control of premium assets,
and reduced administrative costs. In addition, employers' self-funding allows them
to avoid potentially costly state regulation, including premium taxes, reserved
funding requirements, benefit mandates, any-willing-provider laws, and participa-
tion in community-rated or high-risk pools. Employers also indicate that the ability
to maintain national uniformity in plan design and benefits through self-funding
enhances employee relations."
This second "advantage" for self-funded firms clearly poses a problem for state
health care planners. If reforms cannot reach self-funded plans, is meaningful
reform possible at the state level? This Note argues that, although ERIS~s
preemption clause does place limits on state reform efforts, it does not block
them altogether.
In 1994 several bills surfaced on Capitol Hill proposing to give ERISA
12. Currently available data sources do not provide sufficient detail to gauge such trends accurately,
in part because ERISA preempts states from requiring health plans to report such data and federal data
collection efforts have been limited. ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 3.
13. ERISA requirements (reporting requirements, criteria for pension eligibility, fiduciary duty
standards, causes of action, and an insurance mechanism to guarantee payment of certain pension
benefits) apply to all private employer-based health plans, whether fully insured through a third party
or self-funded. Governmental plans-those offered by local, state, or federal governments-and church
plans are generally excepted from ERISA requirements. 29 U.S.C § 1003 (1982).
14. STATES RESPOND, supra note 2, at 2. A new GAO report estimates that roughly 114 million
individuals (44% of the U.S. population) are covered by ERISA health plans. In most of these ERISA
plans, the employer purchases health care coverage from a third-party insurer that is subject to state
insurance regulation and insurance premium taxation. But for nearly 40% of these plans, covering about
44 million people, the employer chooses to self-fund and retain the risk for its health plan. ISSUES,
TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 2-3.
See also James R. Tallon, Jr., ERISA: A Thorn in States' Sides, NEWSDAY, Nov. 3, 1994, at A38
("In the 1970s, only 4% of health benefits in the United States were paid by self-insured plans. Thus,
ERISA's ban on state regulation of such plans had far less bite than it does today, when 44 percent of
benefits are paid by these plans."). See generally C.B. Sullivan & T. Rice, The Health Insurance Picture
in 1990, 10 HEALTH AFF. 104-15 (1991).
For a good history of early pension plan expansion in the United States, see David Gregory, The
Scope of ERISA Preemption of State Law: A Study in Effective Federalism, 48 U. Prrr L. REV. 427,
437-40 (1987), which traces pension plan coverage for employees from 1875 to 1970.
15. ISSUES, TRENDS, AND CHALLENGES, supra note 8, at 14.
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waivers to a handful of states taking the lead on reform. 6 Because compre-
hensive federal action on health care seemed in the offing, they went nowhere.
But with the death of comprehensive federal health care reform-and a broader
national political movement favoring state flexibility-the day of reckoning may
be at hand for state-level health care reform. As one commmentator notes:
At a time when Medicare and Medicaid are being slashed by a Republican-
controlled Congress, states are more desperate than ever to locate alternative health
care dollars. As a result, they are seeking to amend ERISA and currently pending
before Congress are three bills that, if adopted, would do just that. 7
ERISA-bashing reached a fever pitch last year when, at its annual summer con-
ference in Washington, D.C., the National Governors' Association made
reform of the twenty-year-old law a priority:
ERISA's reach is very broad, and it continues to expand into areas such as hospital
rate setting, risk pooling, and provider taxes over which states long believed they
had jurisdiction. Rather than encouraging state experimentation with new
approaches to health care delivery, the act is likely to stifle innovation ...
National health policy should be established by Congress, not the federal courts.
* . .If Congress does not enact a comprehensive universal federal program, it is
only through relief from ERISA that states can regulate insurance markets and
delivery systems to achieve equity in coverage and financing.'"
Frowning on judicial policymaking, the Association's report emphasized federal
legislative options to increase state health care reform flexibility. 19
But 1995 brought huge shifts in states' health care reform movements. The
1994 Republican revolution produced congressional leaders skeptical of Big
Government and intent on handing the states responsibility for policy areas tra-
ditionally administered by Washington. "The philosophy behind this change,
dubbed 'devolution' by policy wonks .. .holds that the states are inherently
more efficient than the federal government [in areas such as health care reform]
because they are closer to the people they serve."2' This philosophical shift
dovetails with a U.S. Supreme Court ruling on a challenge to the legality of
state rate-setting in a critical case, New York State Conference of Blue Cross
16. Current law provides for states to request and be granted a Medicaid waiver, which essentially
permits them to disregard selected Medicaid requirements that would otherwise apply. See 42 U.S.C.§ 1315. Some states would like ERISA amended to establish a similar mechanism for granting ERISA
waivers.
17. Molly Rath. Federal Door to State Health Care Reform Slowly Opening, DAILY REC., July 15,
1995, at 2.
18. PATRICIA A. BUTLER, NAT'L GOVERNORS' ASS'N, ROADBLOCK TO REFORM: ERISA
IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE HEALTH CARE INImATIvEs 33 (1994). See generally NGA Demands ERISA
Relief Adopts New Reform Policy, Inside Health Care Reform, Feb. 1, 1994, available in WESTLAW,
INHECR, File No. 2616125.
19. BUTLER, supra note 18, at 22-32.
20. Kevin Kelly et al., Power to the States, Bus. WK., Aug. 7, 1995, at 48, 49.
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& Blue Shield Plans v. Tmvelers Ins. Co.,21 that states have long and
anxiously awaited. At stake were state powers to regulate hospital rates, tax
providers, and set health care standards.
In a unanimous April 26 decision that sent shock waves through the
commercial insurance, health maintenance organization (HMO), and risk
management industries, the Supreme Court held that ERISA does not preempt
a New York rate-setting law that imposes surcharges on hospital bills paid by
commercial insurers and certain self-funders but not on those paid by Blue
Cross & Blue Shield plans. The law was designed to help Blue Cross & Blue
Shield, which insures a broader array of patients, compete more effectively
with commercial insurers. About half the states in the country have similar
provisions, according to New York officials.22
The decision surprised many benefit law experts by reversing a recent trend
of broad federal court interpretation of ERISA's preemption clause. This
decision alone, however, cannot overcome the long history of blaming ERISA
for blocking virtually all health care reforms at the state level, typified by two
commentators' charge that:
ERISA preemption has been used to eviscerate state attempts to regulate both health
care financing and health care delivery. Preemption has undercut efforts to
implement employer mandates and to cross-subsidize uncompensated care and high-
risk pools. It is now being invoked to deny the states any meaningful role in
regulating HMOs, PPOs, and insurer/provider relations. All of this is occurring
despite the absence of any countervailing federal substantive regulation of such
entities and their activities.'
Although Tmvelers may have provided states more flexibility in some areas,
particularly rate-setting and provider taxes, ERISA opponents complain that it
"hasn't really made the regulatory waters any less murky."24 Health policy-
makers still fear that
[gliven the pervasiveness of self-insurance... almost any scheme states devise to
broaden insurance coverage and spread risk appears subject to challenge on ERISA
grounds. That means everything, from risk pools and mandated benefits, already
ruled inapplicable to self-insured plans by the courts, to the later generation of
employer mandates, insurance reforms like guaranteed issue and community rating
and even the seemingly innocuous task of data collection, is off the table.'
21. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
22. Court Backs States on Hospital Fees; Justices Allow Charging of Different Rates Based on
Patient's Coverage, WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1995, at B12.
23. Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan, The Critical Role of ERISA in State Health
Reform, HEALTH AFF., Spring (11) 1994, at 142, 152.
24. Rath, supra note 17, at 3.
25. ERISA: States Push to Raze the Biggest Barrier to Health Reform, STATE HEALTH NOTES, Nov.
14, 1994, at I [hereinafter Biggest Barrier].
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In short, this preemption doctrine has led one commentator to bestow on
ERISA the dubious distinction of being "the law that ate health care re-
form. "26
In the wake of the Court's ruling in Travelers, there is still cause for
concern about ERISA preemption, but also a new optimism suggesting greater
flexibility for states. Prior to Travelers, courts interpreted ERISA's preemption
power very broadly, and reformers were cowed. This broad construction of the
preemption power may be waning, however, depending on how widely the
Travelers decision is applied. Even if the Travelers limitation on ERISA
preemption, which dealt only with provider surcharges, is not applied to other
types of health care regulation in the states, much reform can still take place,
contrary to the opinion of many analysts. Thus, Travelers may open new areas
of reform that previously appeared closed, or it may simply give reformers
more courage to pursue reform options that in fact were already open to them.
The Travelers case underscores the fact that ERISA preemption is not as
stifling to reform as many state policymakers believe. Recent attacks on ERISA
have lacked a comprehensive and evenhanded discussion of what health policy
analysts and state policymakers clearly can and cannot do under the Act.
Policymakers who seek to amend or even repeal ERISA must clearly
understand the contours of this most complex and important law, lest in slaying
one monster they inadvertently create another. This Note submits that ERISA
does in fact allow states substantial flexibility to enact health reform initiatives.
State policymakers merely need a good road map to guide them through
ERISA's intimidating and seemingly incomprehensible byways.
This Note seeks to provide guidance to reform-minded state policymakers.
Part I reviews the sparse legislative history and conflicting motivations behind
the preemption clause and the Supreme Court's interpretation thereof. Part II
describes ERISA's implications for various state health care financing, cost
containment, and administrative strategies-explaining which initiatives ERISA
clearly permits, clearly prohibits, and affects with uncertainty. Part III con-
cludes that, in a variety of cases, states do not need explicit legislative relief
from ERISA in order to implement health care reforms; rather, states need
clarification about what they definitely can and cannot do under the law.
I. ERISA PREEMPTION
Three provisions form the basis for ERISA preemption doctrine. First is the
26. Martin, supra note 1, at 40. See also Selling an Idea, MED. & HEALTH, June 15, 1992, in
"Perspectives" insert (Alicia Pelrine, a National Governors' Association lobbyist, explains: "We are
caught between a rock and a hard place. . . . On the one hand Congress wants to support incremental
reforms in the states, and on the other if business succeeds in killing any hopes we might have, we can't
do anything but nibble around the edges.").
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very broad, sweeping language of the preemption clause.27 Preemption is
presumed if the state law "relate[s] to" any employee benefit plan. Second is
a savings clause that may "save" from preemption a state law that falls within
the bounds of the preemption clause if the law regulates insurance, banking,
or securities.2" Third is the requirement that the savings clause save state
insurance regulation laws only to the extent that they regulate genuine
insurance companies or insurance contracts.29 A state may not "deem" an
employee benefit plan an "insurance plan" in an effort to avoid preemption if
the benefit plan would not otherwise qualify as an insurance company or
contract.3" The "deemer" clause thus limits the application of the "savings"
clause to conventionally insured employee benefit plans. The net effect of this
tripartite structure is to preempt states from regulating self-funded plans.
Policymakers share a strong consensus that the courts have adopted an
expansive reading of the ambiguous ERISA preemption language in health care
cases.3 The Supreme Court itself has from time to time emphasized the
breadth of ERISA's preemption provision,32 requiring that the "relates to"
language be given its broad common-sense meaning so as to displace state laws
that concern themselves even indirectly with employee benefit plans. Pointing
out that "the key to [ERISA's preemption clause] is found in the words 'relate
to,'" the Court reiterated that a state law may be preempted even though it
does not address "the specific subjects covered by ERISA." 33 The Court has
delineated the breadth of the preemption clause as follows: "A law 'relates to'
an employee benefit plan, in the normal sense of the phrase, if it has a
connection with or reference to such a plan."' It is not surprising, therefore,
that the Court has "virtually taken it for granted that state laws which are
specifically designed to affect employee benefit plans are preempted. ""
In Travelers, however, its most recent ERISA preemption opinion, the
Court went to great lengths to disabuse this perception. The Court addressed
preemption doctrine generally by first acknowledging that its past cases have
recognized that the Supremacy Clause may entail preemption of state law either
27. "Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter
relate to any employee benefit plan.. . ." 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
28. "Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subehapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities." 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(2)(A).
29. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
30. Id.
31. See Martin, supra note 1, at 86 ("The trend toward interpreting the ERISA pre-emption broadly
... began in the late 1970s but snowballed during the '80s, one of the little-known effects of the
Reagan-Bush 'revolution' in the federal courts.").
32. See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138-42 (1990) (citing cases emphasizing
breadth of provision).
33. Id. at 138.
34. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96-97 (1983).
35. Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, 486 U.S. 825, 829 (1988) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted).
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expressly, implicitly, or by a conflict between federal and state law. The Court
then emphasized, however, that despite these multiple opportunities for federal
preeminence, it has never assumed lightly that Congress has derogated state
regulation but instead has addressed preemption claims upon the premise that
Congress does not intend to supplant state law:
Indeed, in cases like [Travelers], where federal law is said to bar state action in
fields of traditional state regulation ... we have worked on the "assumption that
the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal
Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress."36
In determining congressional intent, the Travelers Court began with the text
of the preemption provision, which it found "unhelpful," and then looked
instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute as a guide to the scope of state
regulatory power that Congress intended to survive.37 The Court found that
ERISA's basic thrust was to permit the nationally uniform administration of
employee benefit plans by eliminating conflicting state regulation and reiterated
that state laws mandating benefits or otherwise directly regulating the content
or administration of plans are preempted. However, the Court distinguished
New York's system from these preempted state laws because the New York
law's purpose was to assist Blue Cross & Blue Shield rather than to regulate
the content or administration of employee benefit plans.38
It is unclear how much or how quickly this new exercise of statutory
construction will win over risk-averse health care reformers convinced that
"ERISA preempts the world"39 and "paralyze[s] state health initiatives, " 4
but it is a marked shift from the history of automatically giving ERISA's
preemption clause a broad interpretation. Given the dearth of legislative
guidance as to how to read the words of the preemption clause, courts looked
only to the words of the statute themselves and generally concluded that "[tihe
governing text of ERISA is clearly expansive.""
Nevertheless, courts have often found ERISNs preemption provisions to
be frustratingly vague, calling them "a veritable Sargasso Sea of obfusca-
tion."42 The conflicting legislative history supports such exasperation. While
36. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1676 (1995) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
37. Id. at 1677.
38. The Court noted that the state decision to assist the Blues plans was based on its ability to pay
hospitals more promptly and its long history of open enrollment. Id. at 1678-79.
39. Martin, supra note 1, at 86 (quoting Mary Ellen Signorille, an American Association of Retired
Persons attorney).
40. Id. at 42 (quoting Peter Groom of the New York Department of Insurance).
41. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995).
42. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 717 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671
(1995)
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Representative John Dent, House sponsor of ERISA, called the broad
preemption clause the new legislation's "crowning achievement,"43 Senator
Jacob Javits, another sponsor, suggested the need to refine ERISA preemption,
emphasizing that the "desirability of further regulation-at either the State or
Federal level-undoubtedly warrants further attention.""
Twenty years after Javits's observation, policymakers are asking if that time
has come. This Note, following Travelers' lead, submits that it has. While the
Supreme Court has remarked previously that ERISA's preemption clause is
"not a model of legislative drafting, "4 it has not, until now, advocated
"go[ing] beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty of defining its
key term,"46 and looking instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute. These
objectives include "avoid[ing] a multiplicity of regulation in order to permit the
nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans"47 but do not
include "displac[ing] general health care regulation" 4 -historically a matter
of local concern.
A. Legislative History
The history of section 514 of ERISA-which preempts state laws that "re-
late to any employee benefit plan" but permits states to continue to regulate the
business of insurance49-indicates that neither the original House nor Senate
ERISA bills contained as broad a preemption clause as the final legislation.
The House bill would have limited ERISA preemption to state regulation
of matters expressly covered by federal law: reporting, disclosure, and
fiduciary responsibilities; funding and financing requirements; and nonforfeitab-
ility provisions.5 0 After the House approved H.R. 251 and sent it to the
Senate, Senator Williams amended the House's version by striking out H.R.
2 and replacing it with H.R. 4200.52 The Senate version, broader than the
House bill, preempted state laws relating to plan administration. Still, both
versions had ERISA preempt state laws relating to employee benefit plans only
if the state laws directly conflicted with or were identical to ERISA.
A joint conference produced final legislation containing much broader pre-
emption language than either of the earlier proposals. Rather than the test of
whether state law relates to ERISA, the final legislation used a much broader
test of whether the state law related to any employee benefit plan not otherwise
43. 120 CONG. REC. 29,197 (1974).
44. 120 CONG. REc. 29,942 (1974).
45. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985).
46. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995).
47. Id. at 1672.
48. Id. at 1680.
49. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
50. H.R. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1974).
51. H.R. Rep. No. 2, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
52. H.R. Rep. No. 4200, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
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exempt from the Act.53
Congress debated and later enacted ERISA during the tumultuous Watergate
crisis. Some commentators have suggested that the disruption of Watergate
rendered the ERISA framers' intent unreliable and undisciplined and led
Congress to fail to consider sufficiently the consequences of unrestrained
ERISA preemption.54 Courts should thus not consider the original intent of
ERISA's chief sponsors regarding its preemptive scope an important guide to
subsequent judicial constructions55-especially not to claim a "clear congres-
sional intent" in favor of broad preemption.
Other commentators counter that Congress did not carelessly cause
inadvertent preemption of state health care regulation but foresaw and
understood the effect of preemption on health care reform.56 Some go so far
as to claim that the conference committee deliberately inserted the expansive
preemption clause during its final negotiations in response to strong opinions
voiced by House conferees speaking for powerful interest groups.57
The bill's three major sponsors-Senators Jacob Javits and Harrison
Williams and Representative John Dent-each framed the revised preemption
clause as a way to eliminate the threat of conflicting and inconsistent state and
local regulation of employee benefit plans.5 Not surprisingly, interests
53. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). See 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. (93 Stat.) 5038, 5162.
54. Note, ERISA Preemption of State Vacation Pay Laws: California Hospital Association v.
Henning, 16 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 387, 419 (1985).
55. Even when a meaning of a statute is "plain," the Supreme Court perceptively maintains that
it cannot properly interpret the statute without analyzing the legislative history. See Train v. Colorado
Pub. Interest Research Group, 426 U.S. 1 (1975). See also Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442
F. Supp. 695, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aft'd, 663 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), a fd mem., 454 U.S. 801
(1981). CPIRG establishes the rule of statutory construction that unambiguous evidence in legislation's
structure and history can rebut a contrary presumption created by its unambiguous language. While
courts cannot amend statutes in the guise of interpreting them and must presume that Congress meant
what it said, the presumption, though heavy,' is rebuttable.
56. Michael S. Gordon, Address before the National Health Policy Forum's conference on "The
Role of Federal Standards in Health Systems Reform: How Much Leash Should ERISA Give the
States?" (Nov. 18, 1992) (transcript on file at the YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW).
57. Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Shaffer, Semi-Preemption in ERISA: Legislative Process and Health
Policy, 7 AM. J. TAX POL'Y 47, 48. "[S]hrewd political strategists set out to preempt state action and
succeeded in stimulating state policy that was frequently thwarted by federal law." Id. at 47.
58. See 120 CONG. REC. 29,942; 29,933; 29,197 (1974):
Senator Javits: Both House and Senate bills provided for preemption of State law, but-with
one major exception appearing in the House bill-defined the perimeters of preemption in
relation to the areas regulated by the bill. Such aformulation raised the possibility of endless
litigation over the validity of State action that might impinge on Federal regulation, as well
as opening the door to multiple and potentially conflicting State laws hastily contrived to deal
with some particular aspect of private welfare or pension benefit plans not clearly connected
to the Federal regulatory scheme.
Id. at 29,942 (emphasis added).
Senator Williams: It should be stressed that with the narrow exceptions specified in the bill,
the substantive and enforcement pro visions of the conference substitute are intended to preempt
thefieldfor Federal regulations, thus eliminating the threat of conflicting or inconsistent State
and local regulation of employee benefit plans. This principle is intended to apply in its
broadest sense to all actions of State or local governments, or any instrumentality thereof,
which have the force or effect of law.
Id. at 29,933 (emphasis added).
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dedicated to maintaining expansive ERISA preemption continue to offer this
rationale. Deborah Steelman, former adviser to President Bush on Social
Security and health care, expresses this reservation about the prospect of fifty
separate health care systems with conflicting rules and practices when she says,
"I don't think anybody is enthusiastic about the balkanization of health care in
this country."" What preemption proponents neglect to emphasize, however,
is the message, brought home by Travelers, that many health reforms can be
enacted without running afoul of these ERISA objectives.
B. The "Relate to," Requirement
Preemption has been enormously significant for health policy. As men-
tioned, courts use a tripartite analysis to determine whether ERISA preempts
state law. The first step turns on the phrase "relates to" in section 514(a).'
To prevent state legislatures from undermining the new national pension
system, Congress adopted sweeping language preempting any state laws that
"may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan." Whether state law
"relates to" employee benefit plans is a preliminary, threshold matter at the
heart of the ERISA preemption inquiry.6
It is difficult to dispute that courts have read the preemption clause broadly.
An early case adopting broad preemption was Hewlett-Packard Co. v.
Barnes,62 which involved a state health care reform law similar to many of
those in controversy today. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
ERISA preempted California's revolutionary health care statute,63 the Knox-
Keene Health Care Service Plan Act of 1975. 4 Conspiracy theorists who
believe that the conference committee's expansion of the preemption clause was
Representative Dent: Finally, I wish to make note of what is to many the crowning
achievement of this legislation, the reservation to Federal authority the sole power to regulate
the field of employee benefit plans. With the preemption of the field, we round out the
protection afforded participants by eliminating the threat of conflicting and inconsistent State
and local regulation.
Id. at 29,197 (emphasis added).
59. Abigail Trafford & Spencer Rich, Health Care Reform in Congress: Heroic Measures or Pulling
the Plug?, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 1994, at 14.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1982).
61. For extensive discussion of various theories of interpretation regarding the "relate to" phrase,
see William J. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Law Under ERISA: Drawing the Line
Between Laws That Do and Laws That Do Not Relate To Employee Benefit Plans, 19 FORUM 162
(1983); William J. Kilberg & Paul D. Inman, Preemption of State Laws Relating to Employee Benefit
Plans: An Analysis of ERISA Section 514, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1313 (1984); Stephen R. Snodgrass, Note,
ERISA Preemption of State Law: The Meaning of "Relate To" In Section 514, 58 WASH. U.L.Q. 143
(1980).
62. 425 F. Supp. 1294 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
831 (1978).
63. Hewlett-Packard, 571 F.2d at 505.
64. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 1340-1399.5 (West 1990). The act regulated funding,
disclosure, sales practices, and service quality and required that California health care service plans be
licensed by the state Commissioner of Corporations. Hewlett-Packard, 425 F. Supp. at 1297. The statute
also sought to regulate self-funded plans. Id.
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part of a political compromise to achieve passage of ERISA can view the
outcome of this case as supporting evidence. The theory suggested that the
preemption clause was expanded for the purpose of-and after Hewlett-
Packard, apparently succeeded in-derailing California's new health care
statute.65
In Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan Inc. ,' the Supreme Court gave the pre-
emption clause an even broader reading by intimating that, although it held the
statute in question67 was preempted because of a direct conflict with federal
law, a court need not find that a state statute directly conflicts with a
substantive ERISA provision in order to find that it "relates to" an employee
benefit plan. The case involved a New Jersey statute that eliminated a method
for calculating pension benefits (integration) that federal law explicitly
permitted.6' Although the Court did not address the limits of ERISA's
preemptive language, it stated that "even indirect state action bearing on
private pensions may encroach upon the area of exclusive federal concern. "69
Since the 1983 Supreme Court ruling in Shaw v. Delta Airlines,70 courts
have given the preemption clause a decidedly expansive reading. Shaw involved
two New York statutes-one prohibiting discrimination in employee benefit
plans on the basis of pregnancy7' and the other requiring employers to pay
sick-leave benefits to employees unable to work because of pregnancy.72 The
Court concluded that the state laws clearly related to employee benefit plans
and stated that it was unquestionably Congress' intent to give the phrase
"relates to" a broad, common sense meaning.73
Shaw-with its broad proposition that a state law relates to an employee
benefit plan "if it has a connection with or reference to such a
plan" 74-quieted for over a decade the question of which state statutes "relate
to" an employee benefit plan and are subject to possible ERISA preemption.
In Travelers, however, the Court once again addressed the "insofar as they...
relate to" language and asked whether the words really do much limiting:
65. Martin, supra note 1, at 40-42; see generally Fox & Schaffer, supra note 57, at 47-48. Fox and
Schaffer write: "We tell the story of how shrewd political strategists set out to preempt state action and
succeeded in stimulating state policy that was frequently thwarted by federal law... mhe preemption
clause of 1974 was inserted during the final negotiations in the conference committee, in response to
strong opinions voiced by House conferees speaking for powerful interest groups." Id.
66. 451 U.S. 504 (1981).
67. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 34:15-29 (West 1988).
68. Alessi, 451 U.S. at 524.
69. Id. at 525 (emphasis added).
70. 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
71. N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-301(a) (McKinney 1993). The law was a comprehensive statute that
prohibited discrimination on the basis of sex.
72. N.Y. WoRK. COMP. LAW §§ 200-242 (McKinney 1994). The law required employers to pay
sick leave benefits to employers unable to work because of nonoccupational injuries or illnesses,
including pregnancy.
73. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96-97.
74. Id. at 98-99.
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If "relate to" were taken to extend to the furthest stretch of its indeterminacy, then
for all practical purposes preemption would never run its course, for "[r]eally,
universally, relations stop nowhere." But that, of course, would be to read
Congress's words of limitation as mere sham, and to read the presumption against
preemption out of the law whenever Congress speaks to the matter with generality.
That said, we have to recognize that our prior attempt to construe the phrase "relate
to" does not give us much help drawing the line here."3
In deciding whether the surcharge statutes at issue made "reference to" or had
a "connection with" ERISA plans, the opinion concludes that, since neither
infinite relations nor infinite connections can be the measure of preemption,
"[w]e simply must go beyond the unhelpful text and the frustrating difficulty
of defining its key term, and look instead to the objectives of the ERISA statute
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress understood would
survive. "7
C. The Savings Clause
The second step of ERISA preemption analysis involves the "insurance"
savings clause.' The savings clause, drafted to make ERISA consistent with
the McCarran-Ferguson Act,"8 reasserted that state governments, and not the
federal government, would be primarily responsible for the regulation of
insurance and insurance companies. The clause may thus protect even a state
law that "relates to" an employee benefit plan but regulates insurance, banking,
or securities.79
The test set forth in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pirenoo for
determining whether a practice constitutes "the business of insurance" within
the meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act appears to be the standard courts
will adopt in order to determine whether a state statute is saved from ERISA
preemption. The test uses three criteria to ascertain whether the state law
affects practice regulation: "first, whether the practice has the effect of...
75. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995) (citations omitted).
76. Id.
77. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982).
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1988). The McCarran Act was enacted in 1945 to help resolve
federalism concerns over the roles of federal and state governments in regulating insurance. Now known
as the McCarran-Ferguson Act, it provides, in relevant part:
No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by
any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or
tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance:
Provided, That [the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission Act]
shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated
by State Law.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
79. 29 U.S.C. § 1 144(b)(2)(A), provides: "Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates
insurance, banking, or securities."
80. 458 U.S. 119 (1982).
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spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part
of the policy relationship between insurer and insured, and third, whether the
practice is limited to entities within the insurance industry. "8"
The Supreme Court used this test in both Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.
v. Massachusetts82 and Pilot Life Insurance Co. v. Dedeaux.13 In Metropoli-
tan Life, the Court found that the state statute did regulate insurance and was,
therefore, saved. In Pilot Life, the Court concluded that the state law did not
regulate insurance and, therefore, was preempted.
In Metropolitan Life, a Massachusetts statute required specified mandatory
minimum mental health care benefits for in-state residents insured under a
general insurance policy, an accident or sickness insurance policy, or an em-
ployee health care plan that covers hospital and surgical expenses. Metropolitan
claimed that ERISA preempted the statute's application to any group policy
issued for an ERISA plan within Massachusetts. Massachusetts argued that
ERISAs savings clause presented the statute as a law that regulates insurance.
The Supreme Court agreed with Massachusetts. Metropolitan Life is significant
because it allowed states indirectly to regulate employee benefit plans by
regulating the terms of group insurance policies whether purchased for the
plans or adopted by employers as the terms of their plans. It also meant that
employees asserting claims against insurance companies for wrongful denial of
benefits could pursue state law causes of action as well as those provided by
ERISA.
The question then remained open as to what other state laws, in addition
to mandated-benefit statutes, would be saved from preemption. The Supreme
Court again considered the issue in Pilot Life, wherein respondent Dedeaux
asserted claims of tortious bad faith and breach of contract against petitioner
Pilot Life for failing to pay benefits under a group insurance policy. The
unanimous Supreme Court explained that although the savings clause was to be
interpreted broadly, it could not save from preemption state laws that conflict
with substantive provisions of ERISA. ERISA's civil enforcement provisions
were the exclusive means for employees to seek such recoveries. The effect
was that common law tort and contract causes of action seeking damages for
improper processing of an employee benefit plan claim were preempted.
Pilot Life thus further defined the contours of ERIS/s preemption
provisions. The preemption clause itself generally has been given an expansive
reading, in accordance with Shaw, meaning that a wide variety of state laws
conceivably could be said to relate to an employee benefit plan. The scope of
the savings clause was narrowed by the holding in Metropolitan Life to
preserve only state statutes that specifically regulate insurance. The savings
81. Union Labor, 458 U.S. at 129.
82. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
83. 481 U.S. 41 (1987).
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clause, however, does not save state laws of general applicability that may
affect incidentally the insurer-insured relationship, such as common law
principles of contract and tort.
D. The Deemer Clause
The third step of ERISA preemption analysis concerns the deemer
clause.' State insurance regulation may be "saved" only to the extent that it
regulates genuine insurance companies or insurance contracts. As a result, a
state may not "deem" an employee benefit plan an insurer or insurance
company in an effort to avoid preemption if the benefit plan would not
otherwise qualify as an insurance company or contract. Likewise, employee
benefit plans may not escape ERISA by the pretext of operating as an
insurance, banking, or security concern. The deemer clause therefore limits the
application of the savings clause to conventionally insured employee benefit
plans.
A literal reading of the deemer clause subjects insurance companies that sell
or administer group policies to state regulation, while leaving self-funded
companies free of state regulation. In Light v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Alabama," the Fifth Circuit addressed the seemingly anomalous distinction
between self-funded plans and plans that purchase group insurance. Light, a
former South Central Bell employee, sued Blue Cross & Blue Shield under
state law seeking benefits allegedly due under Bell's self-funded plan. South
Central Bell and Blue Cross & Blue Shield had an agreement whereby the latter
was responsible for adjudicating all claims and paying all benefits provided by
the plan, a common arrangement for self-funded plans. Although Light
conceded that the plan was self-funded, he argued that state law was saved
from preemption under Metropolitan Life. 6 The Fifth Circuit disagreed,
saying that the distinction between a self-funded plan and a plan underwritten
by an insurance company or other insurer is critical in determining whether
state regulations are preempted.87
In FCM Corp. v. Holliday,8" the Supreme Court granted certiorari to
resolve a conflict among circuits over whether ERISbs deemer clause protects
self-funded plans from all state insurance regulation or only back-door attempts
by states to regulate core ERISA concerns in the guise of insurance regulation.
The Court held that ERISA preempted application of Pennsylvania's antisub-
rogation law 9 to an employer's self-funded health care plan. The state law
84. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) (1982).
85. 790 F.2d 1247 (5th Cir. 1986).
86. Metropolitan Life, 471 U.S. at 724.
87. Light, 790 F.2d at 1248-49 n.3.
88. 498 U.S. 52 (1990).
89. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1720 (1987). Section 1720 of the law states that "[i]n actions arising
out of the maintenance or use of a motor vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimburse-
ment from a claimant's tort recovery with respect to ... benefits ... payable under section 1719."
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"related to" the plan, but the plan could not be deemed an insurer.
In elaborating upon the distinction between self-funded plans and plans that
purchase group insurance, the Court explained that it was merely giving life
to a distinction created by Congress in the deemer clause:
By recognizing a distinction between insurers of plans and the contracts of those
insurers, which are subject to direct state regulation, and self-funded employee
benefit plans governed by ERISA, which are not, we observe Congress' presumed
desire to reserve to the States the regulation of the "business of insurance. "1
Thus, ERISA's deemer clause does not except from the savings clause only
state insurance regulations that are pretexts for impinging upon core ERISA
concerns. The significance of the deemer clause is much broader: it draws the
line between standard insurance and self-funded plans.
To summarize the tripartite preemption analysis, section 514(a) provides
that ERISA "shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they . . relate
to any employee benefit plan" covered by the statute,91 although preemption
stops short of "any law of any State which regulates insurance."' This
exception for insurance regulation is itself limited, however, by the provision
that an employee welfare benefit plan may not "be deemed to be an insurance
company or other insurer . . . or to be engaged in the business of insurance"
just to escape the grip of ERISA.93 Finally, ERISA saves from preemption
"any generally applicable criminal law of a State."'
The Supreme Court's Travelers analysis of the ERISA preemption clause
is better than prior expositions because of its blunt honesty: the text is
unhelpful and it is immaterial whether this is by accident or by design. The
Court looks instead to the objectives of the statute as a guide to permissible
state laws, the basic objective being to avoid a multiplicity of regulation in
order to permit the nationally uniform administration of employee benefit
plans.' It finds the purpose of the New York surcharge statutes in Travelers
to be one of cost-uniformity, almost certainly not an objective of preemp-
tion,' giving states a green light to try provider taxes, rate-setting schemes,
and other reform mechanisms.
Section 1719 refers to benefit payments by "[a]ny program, group contract or other arrangement."
90. FCM Corp., 498 U.S. at 63.
91. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
92. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).
93. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(4).
95. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1674-75 (1995).
96. Id. at 1676-77.
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II. ERISA IMPLICATIONS FOR STATE HEALTH CARE INITIATIVES
Case law construction and legislative refinements have preserved ERISA's
predominance in employee pension and welfare benefit law while simulta-
neously allowing for dynamic and flexible state initiatives consonant with
ERISA's policy of protecting and furthering employee pension and welfare
benefit plans. These periodic recalibrations of ERISA preemption, however,
have also caused state health planners considerable uncertainty. An alarming
1994 National Governors' Association report warned:
ERISA poses a formidable hurdle to many activities that states would like to
undertake as part of health care reform. These strategies, which may be part of
comprehensive universal access programs or more incremental steps, can be
grouped into four categories: financing, expenditure controls, insurance reform, and
administration.'
Although this Note reaches a different conclusion than the nation's governors,
I will use roughly the same categories to examine what health care reforms
states clearly can and cannot implement under ERISA's seemingly broad
preemption of state law relating to employee benefits. While seeking to provide
the clarity states require for health reform, this Note also acknowledges and
delineates the truly gray areas and the reforms health planners can argue that
they are entitled to implement if the goal is to avoid ERISA preemption.
The Supreme Court has decided several major ERISA preemption cases that
bear on health care reform,98 the most recent being Travelers. 9 While the
Court has read the preemption clause broadly, Congress has repeatedly
amended ERISA to limit its preemptive scope."l° The exception for the
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act is one such example. 1 ' Remedial amend-
ments have also exempted state domestic relations law property settlements that
reach ERISA pension rights."0
97. NATIONAL GOVERNORS' AssociATioN, ERISA: ROADBLOCK TO STATE HEALTH CARE
REFORM, Issue Brief, 3 (July 21, 1994).
98. See, e.g., Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1991); FCM Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S. 52 (1990); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
99. 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
100. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (1982). Subsection 1144(b) provides several exemptions from the
preemption clause: state laws regulating insurance, banking, and securities; state criminal law; the
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, as it existed in September 1974; multiple employer welfare
arrangements; Medicaid "secondary payer" laws; and domestic relations orders that, for example, divide
pension benefits among spouses.
101. See id. § 1144(b)(5)(A) ("Except as provided in subparagraph (B), subsection (a) of this
section shall not apply to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act."). Pub. L. No. 97-473, 96 Stat. 2611
(1983) made this exception to ERISA's broad preemption section (§ 1144) effective on January 14,
1983.
102. See id. § 1144(b)(7) (Supp. II 1984) ("Subsection (a) shall not apply to qualified domestic
relations orders."). Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1436 (1984) made this exception from ERISA
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This is not to say that legislative recalibration of ERISA preemption should
be the goal. Rather, these legislative exemptions of innovative state laws from
ERISA's preemptive sweep suggest a Congressional intent to allow greater state
flexibility. This Note assumes that states would be better served by a different
strategy, one of education and demystification, that clarifies what they can and
cannot do under the law.
While individual court decisions may resolve specific challenges, they will
not clearly delineate the extent of the authority states have to enact broad health
care reforms. In fact, states have room to maneuver safely as well as creatively
within current ERISA parameters when developing health care reform pro-
posals, without threatening the objectives of pension plan protection that are at
ERISA's heart. States should proceed, not by attempting to amend ERISA, but
by seeking to understand what they can and cannot do under the law. This
section outlines how ERISA affects strategic initiatives that states have enacted
or may be considering as components of health care reform in the areas of
financing, cost containment, and administration.
A. Financing Strategies
Basic financing models that states are currently considering include a health
plan premium tax; an employer mandate; an employer "play or pay" option;
an employer tax-based or income tax-based universal system; and provider
taxes or excise taxes to subsidize low-income populations or to fund a broader
public program.
1. Initiatives Preempted by ERISA
a. Health Plan Premium Tax. ERISA clearly prohibits a health plan
premium tax' 3 -a state tax on all employee health plan contributions (insured
or self-funded), whether to fund a universal system, subsidize care for the
poor, or share the risk of uninsurable individuals. Several federal courts have
held that states cannot tax employee health plans to fund high risk pools or
other initiatives.0 4
b. Employer Mandate. ERISA also prohibits a requirement that
preemption effective on January 1, 1985.
103. A premium tax is "a state tax on the payments made to an insurance company by
policyholders who live in that state." THEODORE R. MARMOR, UNDERSTANDING HEALTH CARE REFORM
266 (1994).
104. Bricklayers Local No. 1 v. Louisiana Health Ins. Assoc., 771 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. La. 1991)
(holding that Louisiana statute imposing service charges on self-insurers extending benefits in Louisiana
is preempted); General Split Corp. v. Mitchell, 523 F. Supp. 427 (E.D. Wis. 1981) (holding that two
Wisconsin statutes mandating certain conversion benefits and taxing health insurance premiums are
preempted); St. Paul Elec. Workers Welfare Fund v. Markman, 490 F. Supp. 931 (D. Minn. 1980)
(holding that insofar as Minnesota Comprehensive Health Insurance Act was preempted insofar as it
subjected employee welfare benefit plans and employers who funded those plans to substantive and
reporting requirement provisions of Act).
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employers cover workers and dependents with a minimum defined benefit
package and pay a proportion of the premium. Both Oregon and Washington
pegged their recent universal access plans to an employer mandate, 5 and
Vermont has considered the same."0 But federal courts that considered such
health plan regulation in 1977 involving California's Knox-Keene Act and the
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act invalidated both state laws."7
Cases challenging these laws held that the California statute requiring health
plans to cover certain services and the Hawaii employer mandate defining
required benefits and employer contributions "related to" health plans because
they affected them directly. Hewlett-Packard ruled the Knox-Keene Act invalid
insofar as it applied to employer-paid benefits. In Standard Oil v. Agsalud,0 s
the Ninth Circuit held that states cannot mandate that employers offer
insurance, invalidating Hawaii's mandate that all employers offer and partially
pay for employee health insurance.
Other cases have made clear that states cannot regulate the terms,
conditions, structure, or administration of employee health plans (except
indirectly, by regulating insurers).1" The Supreme Court also recently held
that states cannot prescribe the types of benefits an employer must cover if it
chooses to offer a plan." 0 Washington's mandate was due to kick in this past
July, but the legislature repealed the keystone employer mandate section on
May 8 after failing to obtain an ERISA waiver from Congress."' Oregon's
mandate is not due to kick in until 1998112 but is certain to provoke an
ERISA challenge.
2. Areas of Uncertainty
a. Play or Pay. Although it is clear that a state cannot use an "employer
mandate," the courts have not addressed a modified version of this strategy,
105. Karen Riley, Employers Block Efforts by States to Mandate Health Care Payments, THE
WASH. TIMES, June 24, 1994, at B8. An employer mandate is "a requirement that all employers offer
and nominally pay for a portion (in the Clinton plan, 80 percent) of their workers' health coverage.
Many small businesses seem to fear that a health insurance mandate would be so costly that it would
drive them out of business. Most analysts believe that the costs of employer mandates are largely borne
by employees." MARMOR, supra note 103, at 259.
106. See Jake Brown, Everyone Agrees It's Time for Health Care Reform, No One Agrees on How
to Do It, VT. BUS. MAG., Dec. 1, 1993, at 24. The Vermont Health Care Authority, a state agency
created to study the issue, presented two options for health care reform to the 1993 General Assembly:
a single-payer plan and a multiple-payer scheme. The latter would require employers to pay 80 percent
and employees 20 percent of each employee premiums.
107. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 571 F.2d 502 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 831 (1978);
Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. 695, 703 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 663 F.2d 760 (9th
Cir. 1980), aff'd mem., 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
108. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp. at 695.
109. See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 465 U.S. 85 (1983).
110. District of Columbia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 113 S. Ct. 580 (1992).
111. Telephone Interview with Pam Thompson, Public Information Officer, Washington Health
Care Policy Board (Aug. 19, 1995).
112. Kathy Brock, Ore. MayDitch Mandatory Health Benefits Law, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER LIFE
& HEALTH - FIN. SERVICES ED., May 1, 1995, at 46.
Yale Law & Policy Review
the "play or pay" approach. Under this approach, states would require that
employers pay a tax to finance health care (the "pay" option) but permit a
credit for actual costs of employee health benefits (the "play" option)." 3
The "play or pay" strategy, a second cousin of the employer mandate, may
be the first state universal health care model to face a court test. A "play or
pay" law must satisfy three criteria to avoid preemption: 1) it cannot be
directed specifically at ERISA plans; 2) it cannot substantially affect ERISA
plans; and 3) it must be a traditional exercise of state authority.
"Play or pay" strategies can also survive if their impact on a plan is merely
peripheral. The Supreme Court and many lower federal courts have preserved
certain areas for state regulation by following the Shaw dictum that certain im-
pacts of a state law of general applicability may be "too tenuous, remote, or
peripheral" to trigger preemption." 4 Impacts are peripheral if they do not
increase costs to the plan.
The Second Circuit in two cases even upheld state laws that raised plan
costs. In Rebaldo v. Cuomo,"5 the Second Circuit held that ERISA does not
preempt New York's three-year hospital rate-setting Medicare demonstration
which prohibited most health plans from discounting rates below state levels
even though the provision increased an employee benefit plan's business costs:
"Where, as here, a state statute of general application does not affect the
structure, administration, or type of benefits provided by an ERISA plan, the
mere fact that the statute has some economic impact on the plan does not
require that the statute be invalidated. " "' Courts continue to cite Rebaldo for
the proposition that state laws can impose costs on ERISA plans."7
In Aetna Life Insurance v. Borges,"' the Second Circuit upheld an
escheat law that required ERISA health plans to turn uncashed plan checks over
to the state. The Court of Appeals noted that many laws-including labor law,
rent control law, and even bridge tolls-affect the cost and administration of
pension plans. In reviewing the types of laws that have been preempted, it
noted that laws of general applicability that involve traditional exercises of state
authority and only incidentally ERISA plans are not to be preempted: "What
triggers ERISA preemption is not just any indirect effect on administrative
procedures but rather an effect on the primary administrative functions of
benefit plans, such as determining an employee's eligibility for a benefit and
113. "Play or Pay [refers to] a health insurance reform plan in which employers either provide their
workers with a basic [h]ealth [blenefits package ('play') or pay into a government insurance pool. The
system was popular in 1991 among congressional Democrats." MARMOR, supra note 103, at 265.
114. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 100.
115. 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
116. Id. at 139.
117. See, e.g., United Wire, Metal & Machine, Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
118. 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811 (1989).
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the amount of that benefit.""'9 The Third Circuit also agreed that ERISA
permits states to impose costs on plans if it can be done without affecting their
plan structures.1 20
Most recently, the Travelers Court explained that ERISA preempts state
laws that mandate employee benefit structures or their administration as well
as those that provide alternate enforcement mechanisms.' 2' The Court further
stated that an indirect economic effect is permissible as long as it does not bind
plan administrators to any particular choice or preclude uniform administrative
practice or the provision of a uniform interstate benefit package."2 The
existence of other common state actions with indirect economic effects on a
plan's cost-such as quality control standards and workplace regula-
tion-renders the intent to preempt even less likely, since such laws would
have to be superseded as well.'
Massachusetts' 1988 enactment of the Health Security Act" pioneered
the "play or pay" reform strategy of requiring employers either to insure their
workers or to pay a tax to a state insurance program. Economic and political
changes prompted the legislature three years later to reverse or delay many of
the Act's provisions and to initiate alternative reforms relying more heavily on
the private sector. Implementation of the employer "play or pay" requirement
was rolled back to January 1995 as part of these changes. This year legislators
deferred once again, delaying the state's "play or pay" law one more year to
January 1996.'1 In late 1990, the Massachusetts Restaurant Association filed
suit to enjoin the Massachusetts law on the ground of ERISA preemption."
Oregon enacted its own "play or pay" legislation in 1989,127 although it
still has not begun implementating most reforms. Like Massachusetts, Oregon
adopted a "play or pay" plan that would require all employers either to provide
their workers basic coverage or to pay into a state insurance pool. When the
bill passed, Democrats controlled the government and business interests were
fighting over a proposal to raise the minimum wage. But when Republicans
took over the state House of Representatives in 1991, the business lobby turned
its attention to the mandate and tried to repeal it. In the end the business lobby
settled -for a postponement of the effective date from 1992 to 1995."' s The
mandate is now due to take effect in March 1998 for large employers and in
119. Id. at 146-47 (emphasis added).
120. See United Wire, 793 F. Supp at 524.
121. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
122. Id. at 1679.
123. Id.
124. Massachusetts Health Security Act, MAss. GEN. L., ch. 118F; ch. 151A, 14g.
125. Massachusetts Delays Play-or-Pay, Bus. INS., Jan. 9, 1995, at 4.
126. Massachusetts Restaurant Ass'n v. Hooley, No. 90-7438 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk County Mass. Dec.
7, 1990).
127. Riley, supra note 105.
128. Id.
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January 1999 for small ones. 2 9 The 1993 legislation conditioned implementa-
tion of the "play or pay" strategy on the state receiving an exemption from
ERISA before January 1996, a clear indication that Oregon assumes that
ERISA preempts its plan.
The Massachusetts law appears only to compel employers to pay the tax.
It is neutral with respect to whether employers pay or insure their workers. In
contrast, the sponsors of the Oregon legislation describe that program as
requiring employers to offer benefits or pay a tax. Thus, the Oregon legislation
may be more vulnerable to preemption. Although employers apparently can
escape the tax by providing some benefits, it is harder to argue that the law's
purpose is not to regulate employee benefits. It is therefore important for state
health policymakers not to characterize a "play or pay" program as a
"mandate" and undermine the more neutral language in the law itself.
To survive, a "play or pay" law must not refer to ERISA plans or be
directed specifically to them. Under a broad reading of ERISA preemption, a
court could hold that a "play or pay" law relates to an employee health plan
because it requires employers and administrators to consider whether or not to
modify the plan. On the other hand, the potential breadth of such reasoning
could lead a court to hold that ERISA does not preempt a "play or pay" law
that is neutral with respect to whether or not an employer offers health
benefits.
Furthermore, a state cannot condition the tax credit on the type of benefit
package offered or on a minimum employer contribution. Another ERISA
preemption trigger is that such a law risks "relating to" an employee benefit
plan if it requires employers to evaluate their plans and modify them to min-
imize their tax burdens. 3 The Travelers Court stated that any conclusion
other than the one it drew would have the unsettling result of barring any state
regulation on the theory that all laws with indirect economic effects on ERISA
plans are preempted."' The Court cautioned, however, that it was possible
that a state law might produce such "acute, albeit indirect, economic effects
... as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of substantive
coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers, and that such a state law
might indeed be preempted."' 32
b. Employer Taxes and Income Taxes. Broad-based revenue sources
such as employer taxes and income taxes which fund a publicly financed health
care program are more likely than "play or pay" to withstand ERISA preemp-
129. Brock, supra note 112.
130. In a challenge to the Massachusetts law, the Massachusetts Restaurant Association makes this
exact argument. See Massachusetts Restaurant Association v. Hooley, No. 90-7438 (Sup. Ct. Suffolk
County Mass. Dec. 7, 1990).
131. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1682 (1995).
132. Id. at 1683.
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tion unless the public program causes the discontinuation of most employee
health plans. An employer tax can fund a public program to cover all residents.
For example, there is a payroll tax that funds hospital charity care in New
Jersey "'33 and an employer tax has been evaluated in universal access propos-
als in Vermont.' 34 Vermont and other states have also considered income
taxes to fund a public program to cover all residents.3 5 In November 1994,
the California ballot featured a single-payer plan that combined payroll and
income taxes. 36
Although a state cannot tax plans directly because ERISA prohibits a health
plan premium tax,' ERISA does not prohibit a tax law with only tangential
impacts on an employee health plan. 3 Therefore, it is fairly clear that a state
can tax employers or use an income tax to finance a less-than-universal
program (e.g., for the unemployed, for low-income workers, etc.). ERISA
problems arise when a state chooses to use an employer tax or income tax to
finance a publicly-funded universal program. ERISA is concerned with the
impact on a plan, not an employer. A universal coverage program is much
more threatening to a self-funded firm than a less-than-universal program. Any
state health care program designed to cover all residents ultimately will be
detrimental to most current employee health plans. This is because a firm
simply has no incentive to maintain coverage for benefits already covered un-
der a public plan. If employee health plans wanted to continue under such a
scenario, they would be reduced to covering only benefits not included in the
public program (e.g., dental or optometric care). Therefore, to avoid ERISA
problems states should use an employer or income tax to finance a program
geared toward a particular population (the unemployed, the uninsurable, etc.)
rather than a universal program.
A state can always argue that taxing employers or income constitutes an
exercise of its traditional authority to finance health care through taxes. But to
avoid ERISA preemption, a tax law would have to meet certain requirements,
such as not affecting whether a sponsor could maintain its plan. While an
employer tax or income tax might not be directed at employee health plans, it
would be difficult-if not impossible-to argue that a public program will have
no effect on such plans.
133. N.J. STAT. 26:2H-18.58.
134. Brown, supra note 106, at 24 (noting that under the single-payer proposal, a state agency
would collect the $714 million necessary to cover health services, in part, through a payroll tax (between
7.7 percent and 8.4 percent of total payroll) paid by employers).
135. Id. Under the Vermont single-payer proposal, a state agency would also collect an income tax
of 3-3.5 percent on household gross income paid by individuals.
136. See Biggest Barrier, supra note 25, at 8.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 103 and 104.
138. Retirement Fund Trust of the Plumbing v. Franchise Tax Bd., 909 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. 1990).
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3. Initiatives Not Preempted by ERISA
a. Provider Taxes. ERISA preemption problems arise not from the
financing source of a universal publicly funded program but from its impact on
employee health plans. The same principle determines the viability of rate-
setting or provider tax laws. "Provider taxes" and "rate-setting" are often used
interchangeably. This Note will discuss provider taxes as a financing strategy
(a mechanism put in place to fund new programs) and rate-setting as a cost
containment strategy (a process in which a state authority approves a budget
or rate structure for hospitals or other providers). To avoid preemption rate-
setting or provider tax laws must not require a plan to structure benefits or
administer internal affairs in a particular way and must take care not to impose
too many additional costs on a plan. For example, some rate differentials may
simply create too great a financial burden on plans to withstand ERISA
preemption (though the Travelers case has probably loosened this rule). The
criteria for determining the preemption outcome turns on whether a state law
produces such acute economic effects as to force an ERISA plan to adopt a
certain scheme of coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers.' 39
Until recently, there was a split among circuits over whether ERISA pre-
empted state attempts to redress adverse selection"4 by employing traditional
hospital rate-setting schemes to cross-subsidize uncompensated care and high-
risk pools. It is helpful to take a closer look at the two conflicting federal
appeals court rulings that brought the issue of health care provider rate-setting
efforts before the Supreme Court in Travelers.
In 1992 a U.S. District Court held that ERISA preempted New Jersey's
hospital rate-setting law, which among other requirements had imposed a 19%
surcharge on each hospital bill to fund a pool to pay hospitals facing dispro-
portionate burdens of charity care, bad debt,' 4' and other shortfalls. 4 2 The
Third Circuit reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that states can enact
laws that indirectly impose costs on health plans by raising hospital costs as
long as the laws do not dictate or restrict the manner in which ERISA plans
structure or conduct their affairs. 143
139. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671, 1683 (1995).
140. Adverse selection is "The process whereby individuals who know they are most at risk of
needing to file an insurance claim disproportionately purchase insurance." MARMOR, supra note 103,
at 255.
141. Bad debt and free care are "terms [that] apply to hospital bills that are not paid. Free care
refers to the bills of those too poor to be expected to pay. Bad debt refers to bills left unpaid by those
who reasonably might be expected to pay." Id. at 256.
142. United Wire, Metal & Machine, Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp.
793 F. Supp. 524, 542 (D.N.J. 1992), rev'd and remanded, 995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
143. United Wire, Metal & Machine, Health& Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial Hosp., 995
F.2d 1179, 1195 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
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In 1984 the Second Circuit upheld New York's hospital rate-setting law that
prohibited hospitals from discounting rates and forced all payers to subsidize
Medicaid and Medicare shortfalls and charity care. 14 But then the Second
Circuit took a position inconsistent with both its 1984 decision and that of the
Third Circuit when it invalidated surcharges that New York's rate-setting law
imposed on indemnity carriers and HMOs but not on Blue Cross.145 The
court explicitly disagreed with the holding in the New Jersey case, concluding
that while states might impose some costs on plans, both a 24% surcharge on
indemnity carriers and a 9% add-on for HMOs were so substantial as to "relate
to" health plans.'" In its Travelers decision, the Supreme Court disagreed.
Minnesota, which led a group of states that supported New York State in
the Travelers case, has a major stake in the decision because it is still fighting
legal challenges to its broad-based health care reform program, which is
financed with a provider tax. Last April, Minnesota's provider tax survived one
such ERISA challenge. In 1992 the state had enacted comprehensive health
care reform with its HealthRight Act (now renamed MinnesotaCare).' 47 The
Act included cost containment, small business reforms, and increased access
to health care by creating subsidized insurance benefits for the uninsured. The
Act was subsidized in part by a two percent tax on the gross revenues of
hospitals and other health care providers, including out-of-state hospitals that
treat Minnesota residents.' Providers could pass the two percent assessment
onto insurers.
The board of trustees of a self-funded union-sponsored health plan filed suit
to enjoin Minnesota from enforcing the taxing mechanism and sought a ruling
that ERISA preempted the taxing provisions. 49 The plaintiffs' arguments
were similar to those in the New Jersey case. They alleged that HealthRight
related directly to the administration, funding, and terms of the plan and that
the two percent assessment subjected the plan to inconsistent state regulation.
Further, they alleged that the plan was specifically limited to expending funds
only for the benefit of plan participants. 50 But the district court held that
ERISA does not preempt Minnesota's provider tax. 15 Despite the early
victory, ERISA continues to loom over Minnesota and other states' provider
taxes. For example, the universal access laws enacted in Washington and pro-
posed in Vermont to fund public programs or subsidies for low-income
144. Rebaldo v. Cuomo, 749 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1008 (1985).
145. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708, 718 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671
(1995).
146. Id. at 721.
147. 1992 Minnesota Session Laws, ch. 549.
148. MINN. STAT. § 295,52 (1992).
149. Boyle v. McClung, No. 3-92-0602, 1992 WL 503622 (D.Minn. Dec. 11, 1992).
150. Id.
151. Boyle v. Anderson, 849 F. Supp. 1307 (1994) (citing Arkansas Blue Cross Blue Shield v. St.
Mary's Hospital, Inc., 947 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir. 1991)).
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individuals must still confront ERISA issues. 52
The Second Circuit has recently dealt with two separate challenges to
Connecticut surcharge laws. In the first, the New England Health Care
Employees Union challenged an 18.7 % surcharge on hospital bills designed to
raise $300 million per year. A federal district judge struck down that surcharge
in February 1994, but, in the wake of the Travelers decision, the Second
Circuit reversed the decision and upheld the surcharges. 5 3 Seeking an
alternative revenue source after the district court ruling, Connecticut placed an
11 % tax on hospital revenues and a 6% sales tax on patient services. The
Connecticut Hospital Association challenged those charges on ERISA grounds
and in November 1994 the court struck down that law as well. 54 An appeal
is still pending, and it is likely that the Travelers decision will allow the
hospital surcharges to survive.
b. Excise Taxes. Excise taxes-such as those on the sales of tobacco,
alcohol, or gasoline-offer a final financing strategy. Presumably, ERISA
should not pose a problem to these types of taxes. Sales or other excise taxes
on unhealthful products, commonly referred to as "sin" taxes, are politically
popular. Unfortunately, they provide only a small source of revenue and are
highly regressive, making them a counterproductive method for protecting low-
income populations.
In 1993, Oregon passed legislation related to implementing the Oregon
Health Plan. The 1993 law funds the plan for the low-income uninsured
through general funds and a ten-cent-per-pack cigarette tax to fund Medicaid
expansion.' 55 Massachusetts finances its Healthy Kids program partly through
a cigarette tax. 56 Washington was to raise some of the new revenue for its
Health Services Reform Act of 1993 through tobacco, liquor, and beer
taxes. 57 These taxes represent only a small source of revenue, however, and
a declining one at that; for example, estimates of tobacco tax revenue to fund
ColoradoCare indicate a steep decline of $8 million over a five-year peri-
od. 15
8
If excise taxes were a significant source of funds, they might present the
same ERISA problems as payroll and income taxes, for it is the impact of the
152. See Riley, supra note 105.
153. New England Health Care Employees Union v. Mount Sinai Hospital, 846 F. Supp. 190
(1994), rev'd and remanded, 65 F.3d 1024 (2d Cir. 1995).
154. Connecticut Hosp. Ass'n v. Pogue, 870 F. Supp. 444 (1994). See Why We Need Health Care
Reform, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 24, 1994, at A8.
155. Oregon Health Care Measure Signed, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., Sept. 15, 1993, at IF.
156. Blue Cross Explains its Interests, TELEGRAM & GAzE"rE (Worchester, MA), June 18, 1993,
at A8.
157. Kathy George, A Question of Moneyfor Health Care Reform, SEATrLE POST-INTELLIGENCER,
Feb. 17, 1993, at B3.
158. COLORADO HEALTH CARE REFORM INITIATIVE, COLORADOCARE PRELIMINARY FEASIBILITY
STUDY: REPORT TO THE COLORADO GENERAL ASSEMBLY (1993), at Chapter 6 (on file with author).
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entire universal program-not individual revenue sources per se-that poses the
preemption problem.
B. Cost Containment Strategies
States are using three main strategies to contain costs. The first, global bud-
geting, involves establishing overall health care expenditure limits for a defined
period in a defined area, institution, or sector. This strategy is preempted by
ERISA. The second tactic requires rate-setting, which is a direct fiscal control
in which a state authority approves a budget or rate structure for hospitals or
other providers. The Travelers Court resolved a split between the Second and
Third Circuits on this issue, finding nothing in the legislative history of
ERISA's preemption scheme that indicates that Congress intended to frustrate
states' rate-setting efforts.159 The third strategy, a certificate-of-need pro-
gram, regulates the introduction or expansion of new institutional health
facilities and services and does not raise ERISA problems.
1. Initiatives Preempted by ERISA
a. Global Budgets. ERISA prohibits global budgets"6 that affect self-
funded plans. There is no case law directly on point, probably because this is
one of the more obvious initiatives that would be preempted. ERISA preempts
state laws that limit spending by employee health plans that are not offered
through insurance carriers. To do so would regulate plan terms, conditions,
and administration directly in violation of court interpretations of the pre-
emption clause.
The threat of ERISA preemption, however, has not deterred states from
considering global budgets as a key element of health care reform. Indeed, a
state could regulate spending by government agencies, traditional insurers, and
perhaps even individual residents. The Montana Health Care Authority is
currently considering global budgeting;161 New York is funding the develop-
ment of global budgeting demonstration projects; 62 and a Robert Wood
Johnson Foundation grant is funding development of an annual ceiling for
health care expenditures in four other states. 63
159. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115
S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
160. Global budget is defined as follows: "An amount, set by an administrative body, that controls
the funds available to pay for medical care services in a region, state, or nation. Usually covering
government spending and other insurance payers, global budgets are most often associated with universal
health insurance, under which all individuals in a country are covered." MARMOR, supra note 103, at
260. Thus, global budgets limit all health care expenditures, public and private, in a state.
161. Montana to Split Reform Goals into "Sequential" Agenda, Inside Health Care Reform, Sept.
15, 1994, available in WESTLAW, INHECR, File No. 2616157.
162. Karen Pallarito, N.Y. Experiments Again on Capitation, Modem Healthcare, July 10, 1995,
available in WESTLAW, MODHC 26, File No. 2495861.
163. States Receive Grants to Expand Health Coverage, BEST'S REv. - LIFE-HEALTH INS.
EDMON, Sept. 1992, at 7.
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Vermont has some of the strictest cost containment rules in the country,
including global budgeting which it was to begin implementing incrementally
in July 1993. That year, the Vermont Health Care Authority set expenditure
targets for hospitals and the rest of the health system. The targets were to
become limits in 1994, controlling all health services expenditures, and
subjecting all hospitals to maximum annual budgets beginning in October
19 94 .
4 The Authority was scheduled to begin enforcing a binding unified
health care budget in July, but it will now implement the budget as data on
non-hospital sectors improve." Although the budget applies to all health
services, in reality the Authority only has the ability to enforce limits on
hospitals.
As mentioned in the subsection on provider taxes, following the veto of a
1991 universal access measure, a bipartisan Minnesota effort in 1992 led to the
enactment of the HealthRight universal access law. The law outlined a system
to manage costs and set targets for reducing health care cost inflation. "The
law creates a health care cost containment commission to collect data on
effectiveness and make recommendations on limiting health spending growth,
and sets state and regional boards to recommend how to limit health spending
growth to ten percent annually for five years starting in mid-1993." ' 6
Minnesota's integrated service networks and providers outside these networks
would both operate under these limits. 67
While a state may be able to obtain some voluntary compliance with budget
targets or caps, true success in global budgeting will require a legislative
amendment allowing states to require all health plans-including self-funded
plans-to meet such targets.
2. Initiatives Not Preempted by ERISA
a. Rate Setting. Provider rate-setting 68 exists for hospitals in Mary-
land, New Jersey, and New York, and for outpatient services in Maryland.
Rate setting was an area of great uncertainty until Travelers. As mentioned in
the discussion of provider taxes, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Travelers after two Circuit Courts recently reached opposite conclusions about
similar state rate-setting plans. In October 1993 the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit affirmed a district court decision that New York's
imposition of three surcharges on hospital rates to finance indigent care
164. States Take Their Own Reform Steps, supra note 3, at 3,4.
165. Jake Brown, No Mandates, No Change, VERMONT Bus. MAG., June 1, 1994, at 33.
166. States Enact Reform Laws, MANAGED CARE WK., May 25, 1992, at 4.
167. Donna Halvorsen, Health Care Bill Clears Legislature, STAR TRIB., May 18, 1993, at lB.
168. Rate setting "refers generally to a government's setting of prices-whether for electricity,
water, or health care. Maryland has had such a system for hospitals since the 1970s." MARMOR, supra
note 103, at 266.
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violated ERISA's preemption clause. 69 Just six months earlier, a Third
Circuit Court of Appeals panel had reversed a lower court ruling to the same
effect regarding New Jersey's uncompensated care surtax. 70 It then fell to
the Supreme Court, which announced in October 1994 that it would hear the
New York case, to resolve the matter.' 71 Meanwhile, in March 1995, New
York's Senators secured an amendment extending the waiver authorizing New
York to continue its rate-setting practices so that, however the Court ruled,
New York's system would remain in place until at least December 31,
1995.172
The Court ruled that ERISA does not preempt New York's hospital rate-
reimbursement scheme, noting that New York justified its surcharge differen-
tials on the grounds that the Blue Cross & Blue Shield reimburses hospitals
promptly and, through open enrollment policies, covers poor patients and other
subscribers that commercial insurers would reject as unacceptable risks. 17 3
The state imposes surcharges of thirteen percent of commercially insured
patients' hospital bills and up to nine percent of aggregate monthly charges
paid by HMOs for members' hospital care. 74 For the year ending March 31,
1993, the state imposed an additional 11 % surcharge on commercially insured
patients for a total surcharge of 24%."
A group of insurance interests led by Travelers Insurance challenged the
surcharges on the grounds that, by increasing hospital costs of patients covered
by an ERISA plan, the surcharges "relate to" ERISA plans and are therefore
preempted by the federal law.176 Lower federal courts agreed," but the
Supreme Court did not. It reasoned that while the surcharges have an indirect
economic effect on ERISA plans by increasing the cost of obtaining commer-
cial medical insurance, the levies do not regulate the plans themselves or
prevent administrators from carrying out the law's provisions. Writing for the
Court, Justice Souter said that the surcharges "do make the Blues more
attractive (or less unattractive) as insurance alternatives and thus have an
indirect economic effect on choices made by insurance buyers, including
169. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1993), rev'd and remanded sub nom. New
York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671
(1995).
170. United Wire, Metal, and Machine Workers Health Board v. Morristown Memorial Hospital,
995 F.2d 1179 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 382 (1993).
171. New Jersey legislators had scrapped the surtax by the time the Third Circuit ruled, rendering
the disposition mostly moot except for the issue of union-escrowed funds. Id. at 1190.
172. Lawmakers Avert NY Funding Crisis, MED. & HEALTH, Apr. 3, 1995, at 1.
173. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
174. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1674.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1675.
177. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cuomo, 813 F. Supp. 996 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, 14 F.3d 708 (2d Cir. 1994), rev'd sub nom. New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671 (1995).
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ERISA plans. "178 The Court further noted, however, that while this effect
may influence a plan's choice of insurance, it "does not affect the fact that any
plan will shop for the best deal it can get, surcharges or no surcharges. "179
Hospital rate variations are not different from other common state actions, such
as implementing quality control and workplace safety programs, that indirectly
affect the cost of an ERISA plan, and the Court found it "unlikely" that
Congress intended to preempt such state action.IS°
ERISA threatens not only hospital rate-setting laws that impose explicit
surcharges for uncompensated care, but also other state programs-e.g., those
that set minimum allowable charges (such as diagnosis-related groups
(DRGs)),' 8 ' prohibit payers from negotiating lower rates, and include
uncompensated care in each hospital's allowable charges. One state rate-setting
program that has survived ERISA over the years is Maryland's. The Maryland
Health Services Cost Review Commission (HSCRC) has been in charge of
approving hospital rates since 1977. Maryland is the only state with an all-
payer rate-setting system, whereby the HSCRC eliminates cost-shifting by
budgeting for uncompensated and charity care in the rates it sets for each
hospital. A new Maryland Health Care Access and Cost Commission
(HCACC), created in 1993, is charged with establishing a new payment system
to provide a framework for determining the ultimate price of health care
services. According to one commentator, "[w] hat the Travelers decision really
does is reinforce the legal foundations for the reforms under way in Maryland,
and for the [HCACC] to move forward with its efforts. "182
The Court has now held that ERISA does not preempt a state law as long
as its purpose and effect are not to mandate employee benefit structures or their
administration or to provide alternate enforcement mechanisms."8 3 In the
words of Justice Souter, any other conclusion would have the unsettling result
of barring any state regulation of hospital costs on the theory that all laws with
indirect economic effects on ERISA plans are preempted:
[T]o read the pre-emption provision as displacing all state laws affecting costs and
charges on the theory that they indirectly relate to ERISA plans ... would
effectively read the limiting language in § 514(a) out of the statute .... [N]othing
in the language of the Act or the context of its passage indicates that Congress
chose to displace general health care regulation, which historically has been a
178. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1679.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. A diagnosis-related group is part of a "classification system adopted by Medicare to set
standard payments for hospitalization. Payments are predetermined based on the patient's diagnosis,
having been adjusted for the average cost of such care in the area." Once the DRG is determined, the
hospital's reimbursement is fixed, regardless of the actual cost of treatment. MARMOR, supra note 103,
at 259.
182. Rath, supra note 17, at 5 (quoting Bob Murray, HSCRC executive director).
183. Travelers, 115 S. Ct. at 1678.
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matter of local concern.184
Thus, state regulation of hospital costs is permitted. So are other interferences
with the hospital services market, such as the basic DRG system.',,
Although the case was a clear victory for New York in allowing it to
impose surcharges on some hospital services for some insured patients, the
Supreme Court ruling remains ambiguous regarding self-funded plans. But
these issues are likely to be considered on remand, and many employee
benefits experts expect the Second Circuit to apply the Supreme Court's ruling
by allowing the surcharges to stand, even if they affect self-funded plans.'
b. Certificate-of-Need. Certificate-of-need (CON) programs contain costs
by regulating the introduction or expansion of new institutional health facilities
and services. State governments first began passing CON laws in the mid-
1960s. Today more than three dozen states have CON programs of one sort or
another.1" The stated goal was to slow the rate of growth in medical costs
by encouraging consolidation and reducing duplication of hospital services.
State officials believed, for example, that one efficient and fully utilized piece
of equipment was better than two that were underutilized. Health care
providers and nursing homes were required to get permission from the state
before adding beds or purchasing expensive equipment. In theory, this
produces a more rational system and cuts down on duplication and excess ca-
pacity.
In practice, extensive research suggests strongly that CON programs have
not worked as originally intended. It appears, in fact, that they may have
boosted the very costs they were supposed to control because they restrict
competition among hospitals and, by curtailing efficient capital investments,
actually raise operating costs.
Whatever its modest successes, the certificate process has been notorious
for its failures. It has become one of the most heavily lobbied and heavily
politicized processes in state government. A number of states have now
relaxed, ended, or are planning to end their CON programs altogetheras
even though such regulations raise no ERISA problems. Wisconsin's CON law
met its demise in 1987 deregulation.8 9 Michigan's CON program was
184. Id. at 1679-80.
185. Id. at 1681.
186. Mary J. Fisher, Risk Managers, Insurers WorriedAbout ERISA Ruling, NAT'L UNDERWRITER
PROP. & CASUALTY-RISK & BENEFITS MGMT., May 15, 1995, at 2, 11 (discussing employee benefits
experts' different expectations regarding remand of Travelers case to trial court to rule on effect of New
York's hospital surcharge law on self-funded plans).
187. Mark Tatge, Ohio's Health Care Regulations Draw Criticism, PLAIN DEALER, Feb. 2, 1995,
at 6B.
188. States Rediscover Certificate-of-Need Laws, MED. & HEALTH, Feb. 19, 1993, in
"Perspectives" insert.
189. Id.
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reformed in 1988.190 Ohio's CON law, frequently criticized for being
festooned with exemptions that have benefited special interests, 191 has been
in limbo since it was last tightened by the legislature in 1989. It has been
extended several times but never significantly reformed. The Ohio General
Assembly extended its existing CON law in 1995.
C. Administrative Strategies
States are trying administrative strategies that include mandatory purchasing
pool participation; uniform data reporting and claims procedures; malpractice
dispute resolution in managed care plans; insurance market reforms; stop-loss
insurance requirements; and managed care regulation. ERISA preempts state
efforts to impose administrative requirements directly on health plans. Thus,
required participation in purchasing pools, mandatory data reporting standards
and certain types of malpractice reforms are beyond the reach of state
regulation. On the other hand, states can enact insurance market reforms and
can regulate managed care organizations that are not self-funded.
1. Initiatives Preempted by ERISA
a. Mandatory Purchasing Pool Participation. Some proposals would use
"managed competition " " (not to be confused with "managed care,"
discussed at the end of this section) to increase access to insurance and reduce
costs; indeed, it was the principal cost containment tool in the Clinton plan and
many of the health care bills before Congress.
The concept of managed competition has been developing for over a
decade. A central feature of the approach is a new and distinctive consumer-
oriented institution: the health insurance purchasing cooperative (HIPC).'93
These collective arrangements bring health care buyers together into large
purchasing groups so that people can choose among regulated health plans that
compete on price and quality while offering a standard benefit package.' 9'
190. Michigan Gov. James J. Blanchard Announces Public Appearances for Nov. 29 -Dec. 2, PR
Newswire, Nov. 28, 1988, available in WESTLAW, PRWIRE.
191. Tatge, supra note 187, at 6B. The current CON law has 132 exemptions. Id.
192. Managed competition is defined as "both a slogan and a set of ideas about health care reform.
Largely embraced by President Clinton as an early label for his reform proposal, it proved a complicated
marketing term and was abandoned as a Clinton policy tag. The concept of managed competition
combines market forces with government regulation. Large groups of consumers buy medical care (or
insurance for care) from networks of providers. The aim is to create price competition among those
networks and thereby both restrain prices and encourage high-quality care and responsiveness. The
variation among plans described as managed competition is substantial; thus the label is of uncertain
worth." MARMOR, supra note 103, at 263.
193. Health insurance purchasing cooperative (HIPC) is defined as follows: "An HIPC, like a
health alliance, pools individuals or employees for the purpose of buying health insurance. A health
alliance, under the Clinton plan, is quasi-governmental. In other proposals, an HIPC is a private,
nonprofit organization." MARMOR, supra note 103, at 261.
194. See Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of Managed Competition, 12 HEALTH AFF.
25, at 35-37 (1993).
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Eleven states have passed legislation concerning health insurance purchasing
alliances, and a dozen others have begun similar experiments.195
A state can assure that firms that buy insurance purchase it through a HIPC
but cannot require self-funded employers to buy health benefits through any
particular purchasing arrangement. Because states may not require that all
employers offering benefits do so only through a HIPC, public and private
groups wanting to create broad-based purchasing alliances must encourage
voluntary participation. Additionally, many HIPC proponents believe that
purchasing cooperatives can more significantly control costs and stabilize
markets if they aggregate as many buyers as possible under a given size into
one or more buying pools."9 This is another reason states need to use
strategies that encourage voluntary HIPC participation.
ERISA, after all, creates no barrier to purely voluntary buying pools; in
1993, for example, Iowa Governor Terry Branstad signed a law that would set
up voluntary insurance pools."9 States experimenting with managed competi-
tion can use the avenues of insurance regulation or tax policy to encourage
HIPC participation or offer incentives for individuals or small employers to
buy insurance through a HIPC. While some of these strategies could provoke
ERISA challenges, states may be able to avoid ERISA problems by relying on
their explicitly sanctioned powers to regulate19 and tax' 99 traditional health
insurance carriers.
A state could use its authority to regulate insurance in numerous ways to
encourage HIPC participation; doing so is generally compatible with ERISA.
For example, exempting HIPCs or carriers offering coverage through HIPCs
from certain state insurance requirements would give small employers
participating in HIPCs the advantages that larger self-funded firms currently
enjoy. Recently, business coalitions have been pushing Congress to amend
ERISA "to allow small business owners to voluntarily band together across
state lines." 2' Besides seeking the greater market power that such alliances
could wield, this legislative initiative is motivated by a desire to "avoid costly
state laws and mandates.""' Such initiatives are more wisely implemented
at the state level, however, where they can be more closely tailored to existing
laws and where the unintended consequences that may accompany broad
federal regulation can more easily be avoided. States could also encourage
HIPC enrollment simply by prohibiting insurance carriers from offering health
195. Lau, supra note 4, at 55.
196. See Enthoven, supra note 194.
197. States Take Their Own Reform Steps, supra note 3, at 5.
198. See Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
199. See General Motors Corp. v. California State Board of Equalization, 815 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 941 (1988).
200. Alliances, Coalitions Face Uncertain Prospects on Hill, HEALTH ALLIANCE ALERT, Jan. 13,
1995, at I (quoting National Federation of Independent Business's legislative agenda).
201. Id.
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insurance to small groups except through a HIPC.
Another insurance regulatory approach-regulating individual, non-group
insurance not offered through an employee health plan-also poses no ERISA
problems. A state could require the self-employed or other individuals buying
insurance on their own to do so through a HIPC.2r 2 It is not as clear,
however, that states would have similar authority to impose such a requirement
with respect to stop-loss insurance (coverage that partially self-funded plans
buy to protect themselves against excess loss, e.g., claims over $10,000).
Requiring carriers to offer stop-loss coverage to small groups only through a
HIPC would strongly influence the underlying primary coverage of a partially
self-funded plan. This is more likely to bring an ERISA challenge because,
although the federal appellate courts agree that states have some power to
regulate stop-loss insurance, they disagree on the extent of that authority.2 3
States should be able to regulate stop-loss carriers but cannot intend thereby to
regulate the underlying self-funded plan.
A state could also use tax policy, such as tax deductions or tax credits, to
encourage the purchase of insurance through a HIPC. Tax credits and deduc-
tions offer modest but effective enrollment incentives. A state could provide a
tax credit for small firms participating in a HIPC or condition its current busi-
ness income tax deduction on buying insurance through a HIPC. Still, the
purpose of these tax expenditures-to encourage firms to offer insurance-rai-
ses ERISA concerns because state prerequisites affecting terms and administra-
tion may "relate to" health plans more than peripherally.
More direct uses of the state's taxation power raise even greater ERISA
problems. For example, some state reformers have considered plans to
encourage individuals to enroll in plans offered through regional HIPCs
subsidized by payroll taxes.' ° This strategy raises ERISA problems because
202. Many regulators believe it is critical that any health insurance reform address the individual
insurance market, to which most small-group insurance reforms do not extend. The National Association
of Insurance Commissioners has made it a priority to develop a model law to address some of the
inequities in the individual insurance market over the coming year. See Hearings on H. 995 Before the
Subcomm. on Employee-Employer Relations of the House Comm. on Economic and Educational
Opportunities, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (prepared testimony of Brian K. Atchinson, Vice President,
National Association of Insurance Commissioners and Superintendent, Maine Bureau of Insurance).
203. One federal appeals court has held that state mandated benefits laws apply to stop-loss carriers
(even though these laws indirectly affect self-funded ERISA plans). Michigan United Food and
Commercial Workers' Union v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059
(1986) (holding Michigan statute requiring all group disability policies to include coverage for substance
abuse not preempted by ERISA). Yet other courts have concluded that these laws do not apply to true
stop-loss insurers. Brown v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351-52 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding Texas statute
requiring individual and group health insurance policies to provide coverage for newborn babies with
congenital defects did not apply to stop-loss policies that insured against catastrophic loss).
The Brown court also suggested that ERISA should not shield employers who purport to create
"self-funded" plans with very low deductibles (e.g., $500 per employee). If small employers begin to
design coverage in this way, states will need to define "stop loss" and "self-funding." The courts may
also have to clarify states' authority to regulate stop-loss insurance. Id. at 1355.
204. One such program was proposed in California by Insurance Commissioner John Garamendi
in 1992. Lou Cannon, California Official Offers Health Plan; Payroll Tax Would Help Fund
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it would supplant most employee health plans or reduce them to mere
supplemental insurers. Rather than using tax policy, a state could avoid ERISA
implications yet still induce greater insurance participation by directly
subsidizing firms participating in a HIPC, perhaps by targeting subsidies to
low-wage or low-profit firms.
Another tax option is to limit the amount of health benefits that employers
may deduct and employees may exempt from recognized income in order to
encourage more cost-conscious insurance purchases-a tax cap best implement-
ed on the federal level. Absent a change in the federal tax law, however, a
state could set the cost of a basic plan and then impose an individual income
tax surcharge on the portion of a health insurance premium exceeding that cost
and/or limit employer tax deductions to that cost. A tax on individuals to
generate revenue is not inconsistent with ERISA but could pose problems
insofar as its purpose and effect is to change the health plan terms, conditions,
and administration.
Most strategies to encourage HIPC participation are novel and likely to face
ERISA challenges. Some strategies use the state's insurance regulation
authority, which ERISA preserves. Other strategies-such as certain exercises
of tax power-are safe from challenges if they have only a tangential impact
on health plans. Still others border dangerously on affecting plan terms or
structure in more than a peripheral way.
b. Mandatory Uniform Data Reporting/Uniform Claims Procedures. A
majority of states have adopted laws encouraging standardization of billing and
reporting systems and establishing a system to gather and use data. Uniform
data reporting and claims procedures strategies simplify administration; they
represented a $3.4 to $6 billion cost-saving goal that garnered almost universal
bipartisan support in the national health care reform debate.' Unfortunately,
ERISA prohibits states from requiring self-funded employee health plans to
provide data for claims they pay. Additionally, though states can require their
own agencies, insurance carriers, HMOs, and possibly even insurers acting as
third-party administrators or stop-loss carriers to use a common form and
procedures, states cannot impose this obligation on self-funded plans because
ERISA prohibits dictating administrative requirements.
Systematic data collection allows states to analyze and disseminate informa-
tion on health care systems and the impact thereon of different policies.
Uniform collection of use and expenditure data from both providers and third-
party payers, as many states are contemplating,' will typically include
Comprehensive, Private Program, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1992, at A4.
205. Automation and Simplification of Healthcare Administration Can Save Billions of Dollars, PR
Newswire, Apr. 30, 1993, available in WESTLAW, PRWIRE.
206. See, e.g., States Enact Reform Laws, supra note 166, at 4.
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eligibility, coverage, claims, and payment.2
Planning cost containment, access, and quality assurance strategies requires
detailed spending and use pattern data for all types of health care through all
payment sources. In addition, such data gathering is integral to managing a
system, whether regulators or buyers of competing plans use the data. States
have difficulty obtaining such data, however, and ERISA flatly prohibits them
from requiring self-funded employee health plans to provide it.
To facilitate data collection, legislation creating comprehensive data systems
often requires hospitals, insurers, and other providers to submit detailed
information. At least nine states have formal entities that are studying improved
health care data collection initiatives for 1995.18 In addition, business
coalitions have formed in many states to share such information. States may
also be able to encourage voluntary data sharing on the theory that it benefits
the private as well as the public sector. Yet without the guarantee that data will
be provided in sufficient detail and compatible formats, voluntary arrangements
are of limited utility and invite free-rider problems.
A related strategy, uniform claims, requires health carriers in a state to use
standardized forms and exchange claims-based information. Uniform claims
procedures create administrative efficiency for many of the same reasons that
uniform data reporting does. First of all, uniform claims forms and procedures
can be the vehicle for collecting comprehensive spending and use data. Second,
standardizing forms and processing codes greatly streamlines an expensive and
time-consuming process, particularly for noninstitutional health care providers
for whom billing represents a significant staff cost.
A growing number of states are studying a related concept that would
require electronic information, and reform efforts in a few-such as Maine,
Nebraska, Maryland, and North Carolina-include comprehensive electronic
data interchange. 2°9 An extension of electronic transfer is the centralization
and integration of claims processing and data collection through a radical
"electronic claims clearinghouse. "210 States would electronically link
providers and payers to a central computer clearinghouse through which all
claims would be transmitted, services pre-authorized, and coverage verified
electronically. New York has experimented with, and Maryland has enacted
provisions to develop, such a system. 211 This is nonetheless another statewide
207. Uniform Data Reporting Part of Health Reform, BEST'S REV. - LIFE HEALTH INS. EDMON,
June 1993, at 7.
208. The nine states are Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Maryland, Michigan,
Montana, and North Carolina. Why States are a Beehive of EDI Activity, Automated Med. Payment
News, Nov. 4, 1994, available in WESTLAW, AUTOMPN, File No. 2560226.
209. See Johnson Foundation Hopes to Promote State Health Care EDI Strategies, Automated Med.
Payments News, Dec. 20, 1994, available in WESTLAW, AUTOMPN, File No. 2560249.
210. SeeAdministrative Simplification: Not Simple orInexpensive, Inside Health Care Reform, Mar.
15, 1995, available in WESTLAW, INHECR, File No. 7731065.
211. Maryland Joins the Growing Number of States Issuing Helth Care EDI Mandates, Automated
Med. Payment News, Apr. 20, 1994, available in WESTLAW, AUTOMPN, File No. 2560076.
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administrative reform that states may not mandate.
States wanting to enjoy the efficiencies of uniform claim forms and
standardized billing procedures or electronic transfer systems and claims
clearinghouses face obstacles similar to states adopting uniform data reporting.
The bottom line is that they simply cannot impose a common form and
procedures on self-funded plans. They may be able to overcome this bar,
however, by exploiting the universal acclaim for uniform data reporting and
claims procedures as reform strategies that can address both the real costs of,
and symbolic concerns with, unnecessary paperwork and administrative hassles.
The large potential benefits give states a tremendous opportunity to obtain
universal voluntary compliance.
c. Malpractice Dispute Resolution in Managed Care Plans. The
American system of resolving medical malpractice" 2 claims has long been
criticized as inefficient and time-consuming, even though studies have con-
tinually shown that medical malpractice and defensive medicine account for less
than one percent of the nation's total health care tab.213
Washington and many other states proposed to address malpractice dispute
resolution in their health care reforms. Minnesota's HealthRight law contained
medical malpractice reforms, 214 and Vermont also planned medical malprac-
tice reforms, including a plan to require all medical malpractice claims to go
first through an arbitration system.215 States can clearly regulate standards of
evidence, judicial procedures, statutes of limitations, and attorneys' fees. They
can also require that individuals use prescribed mediation or arbitration
procedures before filing a malpractice suit and can use health professional
licensing to compel providers to participate in such mechanisms.
ERISA may, however, limit state authority to regulate malpractice dispute
resolution in managed care plans. Courts have held that the Act permits ERISA
plan beneficiaries to file medical malpractice claims against physicians and
hospitals in state court because such claims do not arise from an ERISA plan's
managed care design. In Independence 1-JO, Inc. v. Smith,1 6 for example,
a district court found that ERISA did not preempt a patient's state medical
malpractice action even though she failed first to exhaust her internal plan
remedies. The court found support in the Supreme Court's statement in Mackey
v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service:217
212. Malpractice is defined as "[h]armful or unprofessional treatment or neglect of a patient by a
doctor or other medical provider." MARMOR, supra note 103, at 262.
213. See generally Spencer Rich, Malpractice Curbs Won't Work, Nader Says, WASH. POST, June
15, 1993, at Z5; Bill Callahan, Defensive Medicine Costs Put in Billions a Year, SAN DEGO UNION-
TRIB., Feb. 24, 1993, at A15.
214. States Enact Reform Laws, supra note 166.
215. States Take Their Own Reform Steps, supra note 3, at 4.
216. 733 F. Supp. 983 (E.D.Pa. 1990).
217. 486 U.S. 825 (1988) (holding statute explicitly barring garnishment of ERISA plan funds is
preempted).
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ERISA plans may be sued in a second type of civil action, as well. These
cases-lawsuits against ERISA plans for run-of-the mill state-law claims such as
unpaid rent, failure to pay creditors, or even torts committed by an ERISA
plan-are relatively commonplace... [T]hese suits, although obviously affecting
and involving ERISA plans and their trustees, are not pre-empted by ERISA
§ 514(a). 2
18
The district court determined that the state court tort suit in Independence HMO
was a "run-of-the mill" state law claim and, therefore, under Mackey, not
preempted by ERISA.
While the Court has recognized that ERISA does not preempt every con-
ceivable cause of action that may be brought against an ERISA-covered plan,
the issue is less clear when the claim arises out of a health plan's managed care
features, such as utilization review or a requirement to use a plan's preferred
provider panel.219 In Corcoran v. United Healthcare Inc., parents whose
unborn child died after their employee disability plan determined that the
mother did not need to be hospitalized sued the plan's utilization review
services provider. Although the Fifth Circuit held that ERISA preempted the
parents' tort claim against the utilization review company, leaving them with
no remedy,22 it found this outcome troubling and noted that administrative
strategies such as utilization review did not even exist when Congress passed
ERISA:
Fundamental changes such as the widespread institution of utilization review would
seem to warrant a reevaluation of ERISA so that it can continue to serve its noble
purpose of safeguarding the interests of employees. Our system, of course, allocates
this task to Congress, not the courts .... 2
Until such reevaluation, however, the court promised to continue interpreting
ERISA in a manner consistent with its framers' expressed intentions, meaning
that it will preempt tort claims against third-party services that a health plan
employs as a managed care feature.
Thus, states can regulate most aspects of malpractice litigation and may
218. Id. at 833.
219. See Altieri v. Cigna Dental Health, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 61 (D. Conn. 1990) (holding that
ERISA preempts claims against dental health care plan administrator but not claim against dentist even
though dental health care plan recommended dentist to subscribers); Corcoran v. United Healthcare Inc.,
965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that ERISA preempted Louisiana tort action for wrongful death
of unborn child allegedly resulting from erroneous medical decision, by provider of utilization review
services to disability plan, that mother did not need to be hospitalized).
220. Only one state has explicitly permitted a suit based on a utilization review company's allegedly
negligent decision about medical care to go forward. See Wilson v. Blue Cross of So. California, 271
Cal. Rptr. 876, 883 (1990) (reversing summary judgment in favor of utilization review company which
determined that further hospitalization was not necessary; ERISA not implicated); see also Wickline v.
State of California, 239 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (1986) (stating, in dicta, that negligent implementation of
cost containment mechanisms such as utilization review can lead to liability; ERISA not implicated),
cert. granted, 231 Cal. Rptr. 560, review dismissed, cause remanded, 239 Cal. Rptr. 805 (1987).
221. Corcoran, 965 F.2d at 1338-39.
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even require consumers to pursue "traditional" allegations of medical
negligence through nonjudicial means. Their ability to prescribe mechanisms
to resolve disputes involving managed care requirements, however, is more
limited. Consequently, patients may be able to file a claim in state court against
an individual provider but not a managed care plan.2 2
2. Areas of Uncertainty
a. Insurance Market Reforms. As insurers have attempted to reduce
premium growth by avoiding risk through experience rating (adjusting
premiums to reflect past health care use) and strict underwriting (adjusting
prices to reflect actuarially predictable differences due to age, sex, industry,
and other factors), many states have enacted health insurance regulatory
reforms to reinstate risk spreading and to make coverage more available and
affordable. These access reforms, which alter the private health insurance mar-
ket, are divisible into roughly three categories: medical high-risk pools; basic
benefit or bare bones plans; and small-group insurance market reform.
High-risk pools separately insure the individuals most likely to face un-
derwriting problems-those in poor health or considered at high risk of needing
extensive care in the future. Bare bones plans compensate for the generally
higher prices small groups pay by making a stripped-down benefits plan avail-
able to them at a lower price. Small-group insurance market reforms generally
limit carrier practices while still allowing some underwriting. Collectively
known as health insurance market reforms, these approaches may be used with
respect to insurers, but ERISA prohibits their application to self-funded plans.
Medical high-risk pools raise the most ERISA concerns, while small-group
insurance market reforms raise virtually none.
Medical high-risk pools are especially likely to raise ERISA concerns
because they can raise costs to self-funded plans. About half the states have
comprehensive health insurance associations-high-risk pools-to make a
standard major medical policy available to "uninsurable" individuals who
cannot buy one through the regular market. 23 Eligibility usually requires one
or two rejections by standard plans, although some states use a list of
conditions as well.
222. Robert A. Blum & William F. Brossman, Jr., Basic Legal Issues for Employers in Managed
Care, in PENSION, PROFIT-SHARING, WELFARE, AND OTHER COMPENSATION PLANS 509, 53-35
(American Law Institute-American Bar Association ed., 1993).
223. Roger Thompson, Ten Ways to Cut Your Health-Care Costs Now, NATION'S BUS., Oct. 1990,
at 21. See also Kala Ladenheim et al., Health Care Reform: 50 State Profiles, INTERGOV'T HEALTH
POL'Y PROJ. AT GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, July 1994, at 9 [hereinafter 50 State Profiles]. As
of July 1994, 29 states had medical high-risk pools, if a Rhode Island study on the establishment of a
high-risk pool and the phasing-out of the Maine pool are included. These states include: Alaska,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine
(being phased out), Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oregon, Rhode Island (study), South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Id. at 33-37.
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When financed by a premium tax or assessment, the pools spread the ex-
cess financial risk of covering uninsurable individuals among all health
insurance plans in the state. "Rules governing coverage differ from state to
state. For example, some states won't allow employers to move high-risk
individuals into the pool; only the uninsured are admitted. Other states
encourage it. Some state pools have waiting lists."224 To the extent that risk-
sharing pools raise costs to insured employee health plans, one can argue that
ERISA preempts them.22 As long as ERISA permits plans to self-fund, the
health insurance market will remain fragmented, permitting healthier groups
to remain out of community insurance pools.
Additionally, health insurance risk pool premiums-generally limited to a
percentage above average premiums for comparable coverage-rarely cover ac-
tual costs. Connecticut is the only state that bases premiums for participants on
the average group premium rate offered by other insurers in the state. Most
pools operate at a financial loss, causing some states to freeze participation. In
the past, Wisconsin and Maine subsidized participation in the pool for low-
income persons. Arguing that these pools are unnecessary if the market spreads
risk, Maine became the first state to phase out its high-risk pool as it phased
in individual community rating in 1993.6
Thirty-nine states have basic benefit or bare bones plans for small busi-
nesses. 7 These low-option ("no frills") affordable policies are generally
exempt from costly state benefit and provider mandates. "Typical mandates
cover chiropractors, well-baby care, dental checkups, and treatment for alcohol
and drug abuse. Some states require coverage for more exotic procedures, such
as in vitro fertilization and acupuncture."228 Basic benefit plans may include
high deductibles, low maximum pay-outs, and/or limited services.
The first states to offer such plans often made them available only for busi-
nesses that did not have prior coverage and specified what benefits would be
covered.229 More recently, these plans have been incorporated into a com-
monly adopted set of insurance reforms that include requiring all carriers in the
small-group market to offer standardized basic-as well as comprehen-
sive-plans to permit package comparisons. Although ERISA problems are
224. Thompson, supra note 223, at 21.
225. See, e.g., New York State Health Maintenance Organization Conference v. Curiale, 1994 WL
482951 (S.D.N.Y.), Feb. 25, 1994 (invalidating New York risk-pooling law designed to spread costs
of plans with older subscribers to plans with younger ones).
226. Diana Sugg, Test Labs For Health Reform, SACRAMENTO BEE, Dec. 19, 1993, at D1.
227. 50 State Profiles, supra note 223, at 33-37. These states include: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa (pilot), Kansas,
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South
Carolina (study), South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin,
and Wyoming.
228. Thompson, supra note 223, at 27.
229. Id.
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minimal to nonexistent, generally low levels of interest on the part of
employers and insurers have produced disappointing sales of basic benefits
plans, 230 perhaps due to the perceived inadequacy of the benefits they offer
or to the availability of other coverage in the same niche.
Forty-four states have small-group insurance market reforms23 1-aws
regulating insurers to make it easier for small businesses to buy coverage for
workers-that pass ERISA muster. 2
b. Stop-Loss Insurance. ERISA preemption of efforts to regulate stop-
loss insurance 233 carriers that share risk with self-funded health plans remains
unclear. The Supreme Court has not addressed whether states may regulate the
stop-loss insurance that many self-funded plans use to spread the risk of high-
cost cases. The circuits appear to be split on state authority to do so. One
federal appeals court has held that state-mandated benefit laws apply to stop-
loss carriers (even though these laws indirectly affect self-funded ERISA
plans) .234 Another circuit has concluded that these laws do not apply to true
stop-loss insurers.235 Until this difference is resolved, there is a question
whether states can regulate stop-loss insurance designed to protect the plan
from a catastrophic loss, though states would appear able to regulate stop-loss
insurance designed to protect individual enrollees.
230. See, e.g., Dale Kassler, Health Plan for Uninsured is Pushed, DES MOINES REG., Oct. 25,
1992, at 1.
231. 50 State Profiles, supra note 223, at 33-37. This number does not include the three states with
"bare bones" policies (Alabama, Georgia, and Nevada). The states with small-group insurance market
reform that use guaranteed issue (35 states) and community rating (19 states) include: Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas,
Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
232. See generally Actuaries Report Success of Small-Group Market Reforms, Fed. & St. Ins. Wk.,
Apr. 4, 1994, available in WESTLAW, FEDSTINW, File No. 2536583. In a survey conducted at the
request of congressional health care investigators, the American Academy of Actuaries reported that
'[e]fforts by states to increase health insurance coverage of small businesses and other small groups have
generally been successful." Id.
233. Stop-loss coverage is defined as "[i]nsurance by one insurer of all or part of a risk previously
assumed by another insurer (or health plan). It is a form of backup insurance that reimburses a health
plan (stops its losses) when the payments it makes exceed the expected outlays. Stop-loss coverage is
also known as reinsurance or risk-control insurance." MARMOR, supra note 103, at 268.
234. Michigan United Food & Commercial Workers' Union v. Baerwaldt, 767 F.2d 308 (6th Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1059 (1986) (holding that stop loss insurers were required to offer the
state's minimum benefits); See also General Motors Corp. v. California State Board of Equalization,
815 F.2d 1305 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied 485 U.S. 941 (1988) (holding that ERISA does not prohibit
a state from taxing insurance premiums of stop-loss insurers).
235. Brown v. Granatelli, 897 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that stop-loss insurance was not
"sickness and accident" group or individual insurance under Texas law-and therefore not subject to
the state's mandated benefits law-because a $30,000 stop-loss insurance policy protected the employer's
plan from catastrophic loss, not individual employees from health care costs).
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3. Initiatives Not Preempted by ERISA
a. Managed Care Organization Regulation. Health coverage increasingly
is offered through managed care236 organizations-risk-bearing arrangements
such as health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and nonrisk-bearing
preferred provider organizations (PPOs). Unlike traditional health insurers,
HMOs cover all medical needs, including routine preventive care, for a flat
monthly fee typically less expensive than traditional health insurance.2 37 PPOs
provide doctor and hospital services at a discount, usually ten to twenty
percent. A PPO encourages its enrollees to choose doctors from its roster by
setting no co-payments or deductibles for those doctors' services. Although
PPOs do allow enrollees to see doctors not on the roster, enrollees who do so
incur greater out-of-pocket expenses because co-payments and deductibles are
imposed. 231 .
Under managed care, the HMO or other insurer coordinates all the medical
services a person receives to eliminate duplication and control expenses. The
choice of doctors is limited and the insurer reviews the doctors' orders-for
tests, specialists, and so forth. Many health plans may simply include managed
care features (e.g., prior approval for elective hospital admissions, second
opinions for surgery, utilization review, case management, and discharge
planning). As with many of the administrative strategies already
discussed-required participation in state purchasing pools, mandatory uniform
data reporting and claims procedures, and insurance market reforms-ERISA
does not preempt regulation designed to target managed care mechanisms used
by insurers but does preempt regulation that affects self-funded plans.
While designed to reduce costs and improve access to appropriate treat-
ment, some managed care features-such as pre-hospital review, second
surgical opinions, or a primary care gatekeeper who authorizes referral to
diagnostic tests or physician specialists-have significantly frustrated both
patients and providers. In response, several states have enacted managed care
operations laws that regulate reviewers' qualifications, appeals procedures, and
publication of review standards. Although states can regulate managed care
organizations, they cannot require self-funded plans, for example, to use state-
236. Managed care is defined as follows: "A type of health care organization that means different
things to different people. Sometimes it aims to control costs by using gatekeepers-primary-care doctors
or caseworkers-to coordinate the use of medical services by patients. Managed-care networks usually
are organized by insurance companies, employers, or hospitals. An example is the type of network run
by HMOs, in which a patient sees one doctor who determines the medical care, both general and
specialized, that he or she will receive. The patient's access to medical services is thereby controlled."
MARMOR, supra note 103, at 263.
237. See Thompson, supra note 223, at 22. HMOs come in four models: staff (physicians on the
HMO's staff); group (a group practice under contract to the HMO); individual practice associations
(HMO contracts with doctors who practice in their own offices); and networks (a hybrid that combines
one or more of the other three models).
238. Id.
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authorized managed care review organizations or to follow state-imposed
review requirements. ERISA bars regulation by a state that wants to permit
self-funded plans but regulate the conduct of their managed care activities.
Other laws regulating managed care organizations do not run afoul of
ERISA because they fall within the insurance exemption. Seventeen states
objecting to limited provider panels have adopted legislation requiring plans to
include "any willing provider" so that physicians or pharmacists are not locked
out of most of the insurer business in an area. The Supreme Court's Travelers
decision does not do much to clarify how ERISA preemption of state laws
might apply to "any willing provider" laws, as managed care plans and experts
hoped it might. But some of the dicta appear to urge courts to lean in favor of
state authority to establish "any willing provider" and other laws that govern
provider networks. The ruling will make it harder to argue that state "any
willing provider" laws have sufficient economic impact on ERISA plans to
require preemption.
In Stuart Circle Hospital v. Aetna Health Management," the Fourth
Circuit held that ERISA does not preempt a Virginia statute that prohibits
insurance companies from unreasonably discriminating in establishing PPOs
because the law regulates the business of insurance. A few states also prohibit
PPOs from requiring a physician gatekeeper to refer enrollees to other
providers. Courts have upheld similar laws under ERISA's state insurance
exemption. For example, in Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary's Hospi-
tal,2" the Supreme Court of Virginia held that a statute regulating the
manner in which PPOs may be established and operated under preferred
provider subscription contracts "regulated insurance" within the meaning of
ERISA's preemption exception.
In CIGNA Healthplan of Louisiana, Inc. v. State, er rel.,24 however, a
federal district court in Louisiana ruled that ERISA preempts a state "any
willing provider" law aimed at HMOs, PPOs, and self-funded plans. The
decision, however, came two weeks before the Travelers ruling and Louisiana's
"any willing provider" law differs from some others in that it specifically
mentions employer-sponsored benefit plans (especially those operated by self-
funded employers), likely making it a fact-specific decision rather than a
precedent-setting one.
Therefore, in a dispute over whether ERISA preempts a state's "any willing
provider" law from barring a managed care practice, one can credibly argue
that "any willing provider" laws govern the business of insurance, not
employee health benefit plans, and as such are specifically saved from ERISA
preemption.
239. 995 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 579.
240. 426 S.E.2d 117 (Va. 1993).
241. 883 F. Supp. 94 (M.D. La. 1995).
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III. CONCLUSION
President Clinton lost political leverage in Congress after the failure of his
health care reform plan and a Republican landslide in last November's
elections. But it is premature to assume that health care reform is dead
altogether. Instead, action has shifted to the states, where efforts are underway
to expand coverage and control medical costs. In all, about 35 states already
have enacted or are seriously deliberating reform legislation.242
A number of states have enacted reforms which are conditioned upon re-
ceiving an exemption from ERISA. 43 While amending ERISA on a case-by-
case basis may have some advantages, this Note argues that it is possible for
states to enact a number of financing, cost containment, and administrative
strategies for health care reform without making any changes to ERISA.
Although some states that have begun to implement their health care reform
initiatives have encountered ERISA problems, legislative removal of ERISA
barriers is not the most immediate answer. Rather, it is important for state
health care planners to develop an informed understanding of the regulatory
options available to them under ERISA. States can effectively draft health care
reform initiatives to circumvent ERISA problems; ERISA has been more of a
scapegoat than an actual roadblock.
For. those health care reform commentators concerned that "the Supreme
Court has not responded adequately to the modern realities of federalism, "2
Travelers suggests a change of mind. Following the Travelers ruling, those that
challenge state laws under ERISA will have to clear a higher hurdle, proving
that a particular law has a direct or extremely acute impact on benefit plans.
Now, ERISA's preemption will be upheld only when the state law forces a plan
administrator to change a course of action or make a benefits-related decision
that would not have otherwise been made. As a result state laws being
challenged in several lesser-known lawsuits that have awaited the Travelers
decision are more likely to be upheld.
ERISA has always allowed states some flexibility to experiment with health
care reforms. The Travelers ruling has highlighted and broadened it. The case
suggests that state laws affecting employee benefit plans will have to be judged
individually on the facts and circumstances of each law. The nature and
magnitude of the impact on employee benefit plans of each state law at issue
will determine the outcome. Where the state law does not conflict with ERISA
242. 50 State Profiles, supra note 223.
243. Currently, seven states-Florida, New York, Washington, Minnesota, Massachusetts, Hawaii
and Oregon-are seeking a legislative exemption. States Seeking ERISA Waivers Face Silent White
House, Hostile Business, Inside Health Care Reform, Nov. 15, 1994 available in WESTLAW,
INHECR, File No. 2616200.
244. Fernando R. Laguarda, Note, Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of Health Care Reform,
82 GEO. L.J. 190 (1993).
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objectives, it should survive legal challenge. The Travelers decision should
give state health planners greater confidence that reforms can be crafted that
will withstand legal challenge.

